Ing. Salih CAVKIC
orbus editor in chief
Perpetual Self conflict: Self
awareness as a key to our ethical drive, personal mastery, and perception of
Go Home, Occupy Movement!!
(The McFB – Was Ist Das?) -
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
Diplomatie préventive - Aucun sičcle Asiatique sans l’institution pan-Asiatique - prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
The Continuum of Psychotic Organisational Typologies
There is no such person as an entrepreneur, just a person who acts
Groupthink may still be a hazard to your organization - Murray Hunter
Generational Attitudes and Behaviour -
The environment as a multi-dimensional system: Taking off your rose
- Murray Hunter
Imagination may be more important than knowledge: The eight types of
imagination we use - Murray Hunter
Do we have a creative intelligence? - Murray Hunter
Not all opportunities are the same: A look at the four types of
entrepreneurial opportunity -
Evolution of Business Strategy
- Murray Hunter
motivation really works - Murray Hunter
Evaluating Entrepreneurial Opportunities: What’s wrong with SWOT? - Murray
The five types of thinking we use - Murray Hunter
Where do entrepreneurial opportunities come from? - Murray Hunter
we create new ideas - Murray Hunter
How emotions influence, how we see the world? - Murray Hunter
World Security Network reporting from Washington D.C. in USA , March 22,
Dear Cavkic Salih,
The President of the Federal Republic of Germany
Joachim Gauck (2011)
"Often labeled as a maverick,
Gauck can look back at a successful career since the
reunification. A spokesperson for the East German New Forum
during the peaceful revolution of 1989, he was elected to the
last Parliament of the GDR on the list of Alliance 90, a
democratic union of opposition movements. He was nominated
Special Representative for the Stasi archives and later
confirmed by the federal government of the Federal Republic of
Germany for this position."
Germany has elected its 11th president:
(72), a Lutheran pastor and internationally renowned human rights
activist. The position of President of the Federal Republic of Germany
is merely ceremonial, but several German presidents have used it as a
bully pulpit over the past decades.
The new German president became known to the public in 1990 as the
principal custodian of the German Secret Police (Stasi) archives, a
position he left in 2000. His impact was such that Germans soon
associated his name with the Office of the Custodian, which became known
as the Gauck Behoerde.
Gauck, whose father had been arrested by the Soviet security services
on fabricated charges of spying and came back from a Siberian gulag
crippled, has been raised in a deeply anti-Communist family. Although he
was often advised to escape to West Germany in his younger years, he
deliberately chose to remain in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or
East Germany) in order to confront the communist regime.
Branded an “incorrigible anti-Communist” as a student and later as a
pastor, he was closely monitored by the Stasi. After repeatedly
preaching about individual responsibility and freedom and criticizing
East German totalitarianism during his Sunday masses, his situation
considerably worsened. His children were barred from going to college.
Several attempts to force Gauck to cooperate with the Stasi failed,
and he eventually became the victim of systematic smear campaigns by the
GDR’s secret police. These campaigns have been carried on against him by
the German far-left press ever since and recently reappeared in social
Often labeled as a maverick, Gauck can look back at a successful
career since the reunification. A spokesperson for the East German New
Forum during the peaceful revolution of 1989, he was elected to the last
Parliament of the GDR on the list of Alliance 90, a democratic union of
opposition movements. He was nominated Special Representative for the
Stasi archives and later confirmed by the federal government of the
Federal Republic of Germany for this position.
Author of numerous books, notably co-authoring Stephane Courtois’
Black Book of Communism, Germany’s most prominent political
activist has been a guiding light for many countries confronted with the
problem of lustration—exposure of the former communist functionaries and
secret agents and banning them from government posts. Failure to
undertake lustration caused ambiguous outcomes in many post-Soviet
countries, including Russia and Ukraine.
In recent years, Joachim Gauck’s activism has been focused on
Against Oblivion and for Democracy, which he chairs.
The former pastor, who enjoys the highest rates of popularity among
the German public, never joined any political party. Described as a
Liberal-Conservative by the German press, he was picked as a
presidential candidate by the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and the
Green Party in June 2010, after the resignation of President Koehler
(CDU), but lost to Merkel’s candidate, Christian Wulff (CDU).
After Wulff himself was forced to resign in February over claims of
various financial irregularities, it was Merkel’s coalition partner, the
Free Democrat Party (FDP), which decided to unilaterally endorse Gauck,
forcing Merkel to give in to avoid a greater coalition crisis.
Gauck, who is known for his Atlanticist views, is a member of the
Atlantik Bruecke, which supports European–American dialogue and
alliance, and he has also been a vocal advocate of a free-market
economy. He criticized the “Occupy Movement” and the anti-capitalist
debates for an “unspeakable daftness,” arguing that he “indeed had
already lived in a country where banks were really occupied.”
Germany’s new president is also a co-signatory of the
Prague Declaration on the Crimes
Unlikely to stumble over a controversy regarding Afghanistan like one
of his predecessors, Horst Koehler, and seemingly immune to personal
attacks, he has clearly voiced his support for the military intervention
in Afghanistan, which he views as a necessary fight against terrorism.
In the eyes of German public opinion, it also helps that the mission in
Afghanistan is backed by a U.N. mandate and therefore seen as justified.
After incriminating reports of the Stasi Archives were leaked to
WikiLeaks, Gauck strongly criticized that organization, calling it a
clear violator of the law and a threat to society.
Germany’s new president is a man whose formative experience was the
fight against communism. He has both a moral compass and a spine. He
does not fear to address difficult issues, knowing where he stands and
After the loss of Vaclav Havel, Europe might have found a successor
and a reliable ally to perpetuate the freedom agenda and cooperation on
both sides of the Atlantic.
Editor Eastern Europe
World Security Network
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March 13, 2012
Dear friends of ESI,
Every year, hundreds of thousands of Turks queue in front of EU
consulates, spending time and money in exchange for a chance to travel to the
EU. In 2010, their number was 625,000. Often they receive a single-entry visa
valid for only a few days. Sometimes they are denied entry outright.
The visa barrier erected around both the 26-country Schengen zone and the United
Kingdom and Ireland is a source of intense frustration for Turkish citizens and
officials. They are right to feel wronged: Turkey is the only EU candidate
country without a visa-free travel regime with the EU. Even Moldova and Ukraine,
which have yet to receive any promise of membership, participate in an EU visa
liberalisation process. Other eastern neighbours are expected to follow suit.
There are even discussions about visa-free travel for Russians. Mexicans,
Brazilians, Guatemalans, Israelis and Malaysians can also all travel to the EU
without a visa.
In 2008 the EU launched a
visa liberalisation process for five Western Balkans states. Each received a
"visa roadmap" which listed close to 50 specific and demanding conditions.
The EU closely monitored progress at every step, sending many fact-finding
missions to the field. But Balkan leaders had also received a clear promise that
they would be treated fairly. They were. When they fulfilled the EU's conditions
(ranging from passport security to improved border control to intensified police
cooperation with the EU) in 2009 and 2010, the visa requirement was lifted.
While Turks see Serbs, Albanians and Bosnians travel to the EU
without a visa, the EU has refused to offer them even the perspective of a visa
liberalisation process. At a February 2011 meeting,
EU interior ministers only put an inconsequential "dialogue on visa, mobility
and migration" on the table. A closed meeting of an EU working group on
migration and frontiers (SCIFA) in February 2012 showed that the mood of the
main EU member states has not changed since.
Many EU interior ministers believe that they stand no chance of convincing their
electorates that visa-free travel for Turks is a safe bet. What if tens of
thousands of Turks abuse visa-free travel, overstay and even take up illegal
work? What if thousands apply for political asylum? Isn't visa liberalisation
for Turks a reckless concession?
However, there are three major problems with the EU's current policy. First, it
violates the EU's own legal commitments. Second, it undermines the bloc's vital
security interests. Finally, it is based on mistaken assumptions. The EU's
current visa policy towards Turkey is unsustainable, and the time to revise it
A stream of court rulings
EU working groups often ignore that, when it comes to the visa issue, Turkish
citizens already have legal rights inside the EU. In fact, these have already
been upheld by no less an authority than the European Court of Justice, as well
as many national courts. A stream of recent rulings has confirmed the Turks'
right to travel to a number of EU member states, including Germany and the
Netherlands, for up to three months without a visa. What flows from this is the
conclusion that the current Schengen visa requirement, and the EU regulation on
which it is based, are illegal.
They need a visa: how much longer?
Few EU interior ministers will have heard about a court decision
in the case of a Turkish national arrested by the German federal police at the
country's border with the Czech Republic in August 2009. Even though the man had
entered Germany without a visa in order to buy a car,
a local court in the city of Cham ordered his immediate release, noting that
as a Turkish national he could "rely on visa-free travel according to the
so-called standstill clause." This refers to a protocol to the 1963 Association
Agreement between the then EEC and Turkey, which states that both sides "shall
refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom
of establishment and the freedom to provide services." When the protocol entered
into force in January 1973, 11 of today's EU member states did not have a visa
requirement for Turkish nationals. There is also
consistent jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice (Gambelli 2003,
paragraph 55) holding the view that in EU law the freedom to provide services
covers persons providing services as well as persons receiving them.
In the past few years, European courts have often been called upon to defend the
rights of Turkish citizens under this protocol. In February 2009 the European
Court of Justice ruled that
Turkish truck drivers Mehmet Soysal and Ibrahim Savatli, as service
providers, did not need a visa to enter Germany. In 2009, Candan Erdogan, a
businesswoman travelling from Los Angeles to Istanbul via Munich, missed her
connecting flight. When German police did not allow her to leave the airport,
she pressed charges and
a court in Munich ruled in February 2011 that she "is permitted to enter the
Federal Republic of Germany for a period of up to three months to receive
services, especially for tourism purposes, without a residence permit and
without a visa." In November 2 010, a Turkish tourist entering Germany from
Poland without a visa was arrested for illegal immigration and sent to prison. A
court in Hannover ruled in January 2011 that the man had to be set free, as
he had not broken any laws. In February 2011 a pregnant Turkish woman was
arrested in Bad Reichenhall after entering Germany from Austria.
The regional court in Traunstein ordered the police to release her and to
allow her to stay in Germany as a tourist for up to three months.
The authors of
a June 2011 study by the scientific research service of the German Bundestag
concluded that recent court decisions "have finally clarified that Turkish
nationals may enter federal territory without a visa and reside there without a
residence permit as long as they do not take up employment (passive freedom of
services). Especially tourists are expected to benefit from this situation." The
case of Leyla Demirkan, which is now dealt with by the European Court of Justice,
is likely to make the same point even more clearly when it issues its ruling.
Leyla Demirkan is a Turkish teenager who wanted to visit her sick stepfather, a
German national who was hospitalised, and her (Turkish) mother in Stuttgart in
2007, and was denied a visa by Germany.
Why Greece, Bulgaria and the EU need Turkey
While the legal ramifications render the EU's current visa policy unsustainable,
the security interests of the EU make it irrational. Today, the EU needs
Turkey's full support in order to solve a range of burning problems of the
Schengen zone, including illegal migration, the future of Greece in Schengen and
the question of Schengen membership for Bulgaria and Romania.
The most pressing issue for the Schengen area is to secure Greece's border with
Turkey. Last year, more than 61,000 illegal migrants were detected at the
Turkish-Greek border. Human rights groups have repeatedly pointed to
a major humanitarian crisis in Greece. The
Justice and Home Affairs Council on 8 March mentioned that "Greece has
experienced difficulties respecting the European minimum standards for receiving
asylum applicants and examining their applications. This is linked to particular
migratory pressure, particularly coming from Turkey."
Frontex, the EU's border agency, faces an enormous challenge.
Left unresolved, the mass wave of migration
may soon put Greek membership in the Schengen area at risk. Fears have also
emerged that Bulgaria's and Romania's entry into Schengen could make it even
easier for illegal migrants to fan out to the rest of the EU since both
countries border Turkey.
The ratification and implementation of a readmission agreement between the EU
and Turkey, on which EU interior ministers insist, will do little to allay the
migration problem unless combined with other efforts by Turkey preventing
illegal migrants from reaching Greek territory. A Greek-Turkish readmission
agreement has already been in force since 2002. It has done very little to
change the dynamic of illegal migration, and there is no reason to believe that
an agreement with the EU would be any different.
They need Turkish support: Frontex at
For Turkey to reform its border regime, work closely with
Frontex and invest more resources into exit controls requires effort, good will
and trust. Frontex officials told us that they are certain that serious Turkish
efforts could quickly translate into a dramatic fall in illegal migration.
However, Turkish officials make it clear that such cooperation requires being
treated fairly by the EU on the issue of visa liberalisation. Turkey has, after
all, many difficult borders which demand attention and resources.
What about European fears about the consequences of visa liberalisation? Most of
the illegal migrants who are crossing into Greece are Afghanis, Algerians and
Somalis – but no Turks. In recent years more Turks have left Germany in search
of opportunities back home than the other way around.
The prospect of large-scale Turkish migration to the EU is misplaced, as many
recent studies have also shown.
A visa liberalisation roadmap for Turkey now
All this points towards an obvious conclusion. The European Commission should
immediately offer Turkey a visa liberalisation roadmap similar to the one
offered to EU candidate Macedonia and other Western Balkan states in 2008. In
doing so it should not hide behind member states. This also does not require any
decision by member states and could happen even before Cyprus takes over the EU
presidency this summer.
Turkish officials should embark on a tour of European capitals explaining to
their counterparts that a visa roadmap, and improved practical cooperation along
the Greek-Turkish border, is in the interest of both sides. They should
also stress sotto voce that an orderly visa liberalisation process is a better
alternative to a scenario whereby visa-free travel is eventually imposed on EU
member states by their own courts.
In exchange for a roadmap, Turkey should sign the readmission agreement with the
EU whose content has already been negotiated, but which, by itself, will in any
case change very little for either side. More importantly, Turkey should begin
working with Frontex to reduce illegal migration into Greece. Here progress
could be immediate and would be measurable.
Progress towards visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens would create a win-win
situation. Reforms necessitated by the roadmap process would improve the human
rights situation in Turkey. The situation of illegal aliens, for one, would
benefit from changes to Turkey's asylum system. Increased Turkish cooperation
with Frontex would help Greece remain in Schengen and allow Bulgaria and Romania
to join without further delay. EU-Turkey relations would improve. Visa-free
travel would also be good for Turkish students and businesspeople, and tourism
from Turkey could provide a boost to European economies, especially Greece.
Such a breakthrough would also send a powerful signal to Turkish officials and
citizens that EU politicians actually mean it when they talk about respect for
the rule of law, for court decisions and for international commitments. Such a
signal is needed today. It is, in the end, a simple matter of common interests.
To find out more about this issue in the coming months,
please bookmark the special ESI website section on EU-Turkey and visa issues.
With the support of
Mercator Stiftung ESI also organised an
event in Berlin recently, where Otto Schily, former German minister of
Interior and member of the ESI Schengen White List advisory board called on
German politicians, and his party, the SPD, to support visa liberalisation for
ADDENDUM – GREEN/POLICY PAPER:
TOWARDS THE CREATION OF THE OSCE TASK FORCE
ON (THE FUTURE OF) HUMAN CAPITAL
Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chair IL&GPS
Recognizing its strategic opportunity and grasping its generational/historic
responsibility, the OSCE backed by its MS should create the Task Force on
The Future of Human Capital.
For this tomorrow that starts now, our common future holds us fully
The Prodi and Barroso Commissions have both repeatedly
“at present, some of our world trading partners compete with
primary resources, which we in the EU/Europe do not have. Some compete with
cheap labor, which we do not want. Some compete on the back of their
environment, which we cannot accept.”
Ambitiously visioning Europe as the knowledge based-economy,
the Commission’s instrument referred to as the Lisbon agenda links social
and economic prosperity with the so-called knowledge triangle: research
(creation of knowledge); development/innovation (application of knowledge);
and education (dissemination of knowledge).
The recent EC memo (M.05/1999/090605 – Com. S & R) states
“that for each extra percent in public R&D, there is an extra 0,17% growth
in productivity. To put this into context, the average annual labor
productivity growth in the Eurozone was 1,2% between 1995 and 2003. For
every 0,1% increase in R&D intensity boosts output per capita growth by 0,3
Finally, the memo claims that “an increased budget for
European R&D could have a major impact on employment creating as many as 1
mil. jobs by 2030” by simply supporting future-oriented industries (such as
the Bio-informatics, Space applications, Nano-technology and the like).
But we should ask: jobs for whom ?
The ongoing Lisbon mid term review debate is centered on a
main principle: A resolute “no” to any trade-off between economic growth,
social cohesion and environmental protection.
Environmental protection surely includes preservation of
biodiversity – meaning protection and promotion of LIFE – in all its forms.
This Lisbon ‘no-trade-off principle’ accommodates Europe’s
development thinking close to the matrix of sustainable development which
per definition formulates development (reaffirming its human in addition to
the economic dimension) as any societal activity which meets the needs of
the present, without compromising the needs of future generations (certainly
deprived from any hidden environmental, social or health related costs).
Last week in Brussels, as a direct follow-up to the January
2005 JHA Green Paper, the EC Vice President Frattini and Commissioner Spidla
jointly opened a public hearing.
As one of explanatories to enhance a public debate on subject,
the EC memo (M.05/206/140605) reports the following:
“Labour and skills shortages are already
noticeable in a number of sectors and they will tend to increase. On 1
January 2003 migrants represented around 3.5% of the total population in the
EU-25. In 2003 the total population increased by 1.9 million, mainly due to
net migration of 1.7 million (STAT/04/105); Eurostat (STAT/05/48) estimates
that “over the next two decades [2005-2025] the total population
of the EU-25 is expected to increase by more than 13 million inhabitants
[…] mainly due to net migration, since total deaths in the EU-25 will
outnumber total births from 2010.”
meant as a supporting argument to the economic migrants admission
initiative, cannot hide the tragic meaning of the STAT findings – which is
that Europe will very soon (2010), and for the first time in its
history---despite all eventual investments in R&D---be able to produce
everything except (its own new) lives.
It follows that only response to this situation is a
selective/semi-permeable intake of migrants. This short-term compensatory
solution/outcry cannot be disassociated from hidden /mid-to-long term
societal and security costs.
In business terms, this approach would be classified as
“everything but development”: an economic strategy which relies on an
increased volume of imports to substitute for an inadequate capital and
Shall we blame the EC for not inventing the Commission’s
portfolio: Promotion of life ?!
It would be very wrong to hold the Commission responsible
(here the Tampere as well as the Hague program are explicit; MS are in
charge for particular quotas).
The Barroso Commission is limited in resources, mandates and instruments –
as scrutinized by the Council. (At least, the Commission keeps up on
initiatives !) The viable long range policy/ies on such a key issues as the
future of our human capital (and its composition) primarily rest upon the
The OSCE should recognize this as its strategic opportunity by
playing a decisive pan-European role in the matter. The benefits of such
pro-active stance are numerous:
Externally, the Organization can take a lead by formulating an
interagency/inter-IOs approach to the benefit of its wider circle of MS (far
beyond ability of institutions and instruments of either CoE or EU).
Internally, the OSCE can recover both its standing and the purpose of its
mission at the times when its first basket is de facto taken over by NATO (PfP),
and its third basket is a source of disputes (including the budgetary ones)
over its FOs interpretations.
Recognizing a call of its MS for reform, the new OSCE Sec–G.
will inevitably challenge departmental inertia and the influence of the
bureaucratic status quo. Rejection of anti-intellectualism and return to
substantive initiatives, beyond the pure rotation of seasonal themes and
nomadic form of preparatories to ‘reflect’ upon them, would give added value
to annual forums. Additionally, that would necessitate the MS holding the
chairmanship to capacitate more than the limited technical objectives of
producing an annual report, dealing with conferences’ logistics, and
staffing the organization with a few secondments in between.
The very creation of the OSCE Task Force on (Future) Human
Capital could be a sign that the Organization is alive to the current
challenges and fully assumes its share of responsibilities for future
As an example, the Republic of Slovenia, the country currently
holding the OSCE Chairmanship (CiO), will be by far the oldest nation in
Europe by the year 2050. Only 45 years from now, the median age of
Slovenians will have moved from the current (and barely reversible) 40,3 to
an (irreversible) 53,3 years. This will be coupled with a projected 21%
total population decline for the period 2004-2050
Demographic trends for other European nations are quite similar to the
In his last week Washington Post article, Samuelson calls this
“The End of Europe”.
Can we tomorrow claim that we didn’t know, that we didn’t have
institutions and instruments to analyze the developments critical to our own
The OSCE offers a unique setting: matching the geographic
scope and three-dimensional mandates – baskets. (Since its CSCE times,
the FORA has transformed from a normative to an operational organization
with the wide FO presence.) The Task Force on (Future) Human Capital can be
easily included into the existing mandate.
Though a dangerous place to live, pre-Helsinki Europe was
inhabited by young and dynamic boomers with stamina and a vision of the
future. History of tomorrow is not yet written, but one is certain: Any
(horror-scenario marginalized) post-OSCE Europe would be an equally
dangerous place, but this time of over-aged and demoralized populations in
total activity decline and human retreat.
It is accurate to conclude this addendum to my May 2005
Green/Policy Paper (EF Prague), by quoting Jean Monet: “If you have an
insoluble problem – enlarge the context.”
Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chair IL&GPS
Vienna, 22 June 2005
See my Green/Policy
Paper and the statement of the Slovenian Chairmanship summarizing the
recommendations and conclusions of the Economic Forum 2005 (particularly the
final part of the statement), as well as
information on general demographic trends 1995-2020 & 2020-2050 in Europe
and Med partner countries (fertility, median age, net migration, etc.)
please see my presentations:
14 Almaty, Kazakhstan (January 2005) – Second Preparatory;
3PS13EFGeneral 9 Kiev, Ukraine (March 2005) – Third Preparatory;
3PS13EFGeneral 14 Kiev, Ukraine (March 2005) – Third Preparatory;
Or as it is
formulated in the Commission’s Green Paper “Confronting demographic change –
a new solidarity between generations” (COM 2005 94f of 16 MAR 2005); “Never
in history has there been economic growth without population growth”
On hidden social and security costs, see
my speech: 1PS13EFWS 2/3 Trieste, Italy (November 2004)
Politics is always local not a
supranational. Consequently, policies are national, and supranational/intl.
may eventually be their external harmonization only. The long-range policies
(formulation and promulgation of) do not politically pay off as often too
complex and too time-consuming to survive a frequency of national elections
span and the taste/comprehension of median voter.
Hereby used is the
so-called Medium variant. Source: the UN World Population Change
1950–2050, the 2004
Revision (Compared and contrasted with the
figures of the US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census /2004/.)
In his June 15 article, the highly regarded
columnist Robert J. Samuelson summarizes some of these trends as “The
End of Europe”. Following an analysis of
demographic trends, he concludes by observing that the Europeans “are
quietly acquiescing in their own decline.”
After nearly 2 million years of our species
existence (in which a prime evolutionary constant/vertical was a
generational care for the offsprings), last few decades are the first time
ever recorded that humans went beyond the replacement ratio of 2,1 (current
European fertility rate is ranging between 1,2 and 1,7).
Network reporting from Munich in Germany, March 05, 2012
Dear Cavkic Salih,
Former US Navy Secretary
John F. Lehman
on board the USS IOWA.
"The nations best suited by geography,
wealth, and national ambition to succeed the U.S. as the
world’s great naval powers do not share America’s
historic commitment to safety on the world’s oceans, to
free trade, free markets, or an international system
based on these goods as well as free political systems.
The surrender of American naval superiority would
embolden and nourish these opposing values at the
expense of American prosperity, prestige, and power. The
U.S. Navy must be restored to a size commensurate with
its responsibilities and with the nation’s future
security and position as the world’s great power.."
Dr. John F. Lehman
has shaped the history of the U.S. Navy like few others. Aged only 38, he was
assigned Secretary of the Navy in 1981 during the Reagan Adminstration. He
subsequently became one of the key supporters and designers of Reagan's election
pledge for military modernization and remarmament to enhance the strategic
retaliation capabilities vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. Lehman devised the
"Lehman Doctrine", a strategic concept to respond to a possible Soviet advance
on Western Europe. Lehman resigned in 1987 and was subsequently promoted to the
rank of captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1989, later retiring from the U.S.
Navy as a reserve officer after 30 years of service.
In 2002 he was
involved in the important 9/11 commission and is a member of numerous
prestigious think tanks. He is a first cousin of the late Princess Grace of
Monaco, and is Chairman of the
Princess Grace Foundation-USA, a
public charity established after Princess Grace's death to support emerging
artists in film, dance, and theater. In his interview with
World Security Network Junior Editor
Constantin von Wangenheim he talks about the U.S. Navy's role in the 21st
The U.S. Navy now has the smallest sized fleet
since the 1930's. Is naval power no longer a moat?
The Cold War’s conclusion led to a reduction in
fleet size whose end point remains unknown. Land wars in the Southwest and
Central Asia worsened the decline by shifting attention away from China’s
ambitious maritime challenge in the Western Pacific and Iran’s rise as a
regional naval power. Additionally, the prospect that the Arab Spring will again
return the Mediterranean to its historic position as an intersection of
conflicting interest cannot be ignored.
At a time when
danger to the U.S. and its allies and interests is growing the Obama
administration has embraced the view that American power is in decline and that
this decrease can be safely accommodated, even welcomed, in the interest of a
What is the significance of “Sea Power” in this
day and age?
The nations best
suited by geography, wealth, and national ambition to succeed the U.S. as the
world’s great naval powers do not share America’s historic commitment to safety
on the world’s oceans, to free trade, free markets, or an international system
based on these goods as well as free political systems. The surrender of
American naval superiority would embolden and nourish these opposing values at
the expense of American prosperity, prestige, and power. The U.S. Navy must be
restored to a size commensurate with its responsibilities and with the nation’s
future security and position as the world’s great power.
The Navy has many important tasks - one of which
is humanitarian relief. In light of the in recent years frequently recurring
natural desasters across the globe, is humanitarian relief becoming more
the first half of the 19th Century and its role in bringing relief to
the famine in Ireland, the U.S. Navy has been involved in humanitarian
assistance around the world. Most recently the U.S. Navy was first on the scene
with medical teams and supplies, food assistance and support for the Tsunamis in
Southeast Asia and then Japan, and the earthquakes in Haiti. Humanitarian relief
will always be an important mission for the U.S. Navy.
Has the Navy become less impoortant in ensuring national
security vis-a-vis the Army and Air Force and how does this compare to the years
Since 90% of the
world’s trade must travel by sea, and 95% of all military logistics must go by
sea, the Navy is utterly essential to the freedom and security of all nations.
This was not changed by 9/11.
What exactly is the primary focus of the U.S.
The U.S. Navy has
been the backbone of the nation’s global power since the Barbary Wars. In modern
times our Navy played a central role in winning World War II and deterring
aggression in the Cold War that followed. Americans today assume that our Navy
will continue to protect allies, guarantee the safety of the oceanic highways on
which our prosperity depends, and maintain the stabilizing international
presence that are the foundation of the U.S.’s global reach and international
The days of soldiers fighting in trenches are long gone.
technological innovation allows us to construct the most precise
and deadly weapon systems which can be navigated unmanned across the whole
globe. Will we no longer use manned aircraft in the future?
John Lehman: UAVs
or drones are an important component of modern sea power but there will always
be a requirement for manned aircraft. UAVs have been particularly effective in
Iraq and Afghanistan, but they faced no serious threat from enemy fighters or
integrated air defenses. The next war may not be with an opponent without
effective air defense, and UAVs will have a much harder time.
Constantin von Wangenheim
World Security Network Foundation
Security Network reporting from Koenigswinter in Germany, March 07, 2012
Dear Cavkic Salih,
LtGen (ret) Dr. Ulf von
Krause on foot
patrol in Kabul, 2004:
"The Afghanistan conflict makes it very
clear that a first decision whether to become militarily
involved in an armed conflict is crucial. It shows
clearly that having slid into a conflict without proper
analysis, having no clear goals and objectives, there is
a great danger for an escalation and it is problematic
to exit. Therefore, decision makers must take the
necessary time to carefully evaluate the conditions,
define the political goals and the military objectives,
make sure that the resources needed are available and
will be for the duration of the mission, and spell out
exit conditions, i.e. criteria for success or failure.
These necessary steps of mission preparation must be
gone through even if expectations of allies and partners
and time pressure seem to call for immediate decisions.
By 2012, the German Bundeswehr had been engaged
in Afghanistan for ten years. The decision as to whether the
Bundeswehr takes part in operations in an international context
is primarily a responsibility of the Federal Government. However,
armed operations undertaken by German forces always require the
constitutional stamp of approval from the German Parliament (Bundestag)
beforehand. The German Federal Constitutional Court clarified
this through its decision in 1994.
Between November 2001 and January 2012, the Federal Government
applied 22 times to the Bundestag for approval to Afghanistan
mandates. The parliament accepted all of them. They related to
two different missions: on the one hand, until 2008 Germany sent
100 soldiers of the Special Forces to the Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan; on the other hand, Germany has
contributed by now substantially to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF).
Escalation with Regard to Number of Troops, Area
of Operation, Equipment and Mission Type
Over time, the German participation in ISAF escalated in terms
of the number of troops, the area of operation, the military
equipment deployed and the character of the operation. Starting
in 2002 with 1,200 military personal deployed in Kabul and
restricted to the Greater Kabul Area the number of troops grew
to a maximum of 5,350 in 2011. They are meanwhile deployed
mainly in the Northern Region of Afghanistan where Germany, in
addition, has the responsibility for commanding all coalition
forces in that area. In January 2012, a revised mandate brought
– for the first time in 10 years –a slight reduction of the
authorized strength of German troops to 4,900.
The area of operation for German forces enlarged gradually from
the Kabul area to the entire Northern Region, in specific
situations even to the whole country. At the beginning equipment
and armament of the forces comprised only light arms and mainly
unarmored vehicles. Over the years, the German government added
mechanized infantry combat vehicles, Tornado reconnaissance
aircraft and artillery to the assets of its forces. Urgently
needed combat helicopters could not been delivered nationally
but were made available by US forces.
The prevailing operations during the first years of the mission
were patrols for surveillance and liaison with local authorities
and the population. Consequently, the rules of engagement
allowed only self-defense in the case of direct attacks as long
as those were enduring. If an opponent stopped his attack, the
German troops had to cease fire even if they watched him
preparing for the next attack. Later on fighting of insurgents
became more and more important. Gradually but with a significant
time lag the rules of engagement reflected this changing
situation. From 2007-2010 German Tornados flew reconnaissance
missions over all of Afghanistan. In 2008, German forces took
over the task of a Quick Reaction Force for the Northern Region,
a typical combat mission. After 2010 German troops were more and
more engaged in combat operations to clear areas of insurgents.
Multilateralism as an Attribute of German
These empirical findings lead to the question of how to explain
such an escalation of the German contribution to ISAF. As a
first approach to an answer one has to keep in mind that since
World War II, in Germany a culture of a multilateral oriented
foreign policy developed. In addition, German forces in
Afghanistan are part of an international alliance of about 50
nations which have contributed troops. Therefore, from the very
beginning the German Federal Government as well as the Bundestag
always had to make their decisions in an international context.
For the first decision to contribute to OEF the overreaching
reasoning was a promise of “unlimited solidarity” made by
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to the United States that he had
expressed in a parliamentary debate on 12 September 2001, one
day after the attack on the World Trade Center. The
spokespersons of all factions of the Bundestag had endorsed this
declaration. Six weeks later the Chancellor, however, needed his
strongest instrument to get parliamentary approval for his
decision to contribute to OEF – he had to call for a vote of
confidence. This was mainly due to the deep aversion of using
military force as an instrument of politics, which is deeply
rooted in the German national political culture and which was
especially part of the self-conception of the Greens who were
partners in the coalition. The fact that the NATO Council had
invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on 12 September 2001
– without any consequences with regard to military measures –
did not play a perceptible role in this debate.
Another six weeks later again multilateral aspects prevailed in
the German decision to contribute to ISAF. Germany had hosted
the UN Bonn conference, the Chancellor wanted to exploit the
positive image of the conference success. In addition, Germany
had been striving towards a permanent seat in the UN Security
Council since 1992. Therefore, the German Government did not
want to reject the request of the UN for contributions to ISAF.
NATO took over the lead for ISAF in 2003 – actually on the
request of Germany who was in the leading position at that time
and who needed a replacement in this role. The alliance
consequently used this as a chance for a practical demonstration
of its ability as an organizational framework for military
actions “out of area” which had been inaccessible in the
political debates before. From then on, the German justification
for its military engagement changed. It was now “Solidarity with
NATO” instead of “Solidarity with the US”. The demands for
increasing military strength by NATO –mainly driven by the US –
were one substantial factor for the enlargement of the German
contributions. In addition, the reorientation at the beginning
of 2012 that led towards first steps of reducing the military
strength was mainly multilaterally driven. NATO as well as
Germany followed the decision of President Obama to withdraw the
combat troops from Afghanistan by end of 2014.
To sum up: the German decisions were not based on specific
German interests (which have not yet been defined) but by
expectations of allies and partners. It was rather assumed that
the interests of the alliance were identical with German
Discrepancy between Political Goals and Military
Objectives, and between Civilian and Military Resources
According to Clausewitz, the political goals for the use of
military force determine the military objectives, which have to
serve the political goals. From the beginning there was a
discrepancy for ISAF: the German government defined the
political goal as to “make a substantial contribution to the
implementing of the national reconciliation process in
Afghanistan which had started in the Bonn conference”. The
military objective at the beginning was limited in numbers and
the respective area of operation. Since the political goal was
rather ambitious and “unlimited”, it generated pressure to
enlarge the military efforts. Thus, the total ISAF strength as
well as the German contingent was constantly increased and the
area of operation expanded.
In addition, the goals of the partners of the coalition were
differing. While ISAF should be a “stabilization mission”, the
US-led OEF was a combat mission. Two different military
operations in the same area are very problematic, not only from
a military point of view but also politically. The “rough
warfare” which the US chose for OEF led to substantial
“collateral damage” amongst the population. It jeopardized
ISAF’s goal to foster reconciliation and the coalition forces
were losing the backing of the population. Therefore, the
security situation eroded and the field commanders demanded
additional military means to cope with a deteriorating situation.
To achieve the political goal of state building the military
instrument can only contribute a small portion. The main thrust
must come from civilian means such as diplomacy, economic aid or
assistance in building up societal and state structures. This
knowledge is well reflected in different strategic concepts, the
first one to come from Germany. The so-called “Networked
Security” was defined in the German White Paper 2006. It was
introduced into the strategic discussion within NATO where it
was adopted as “Comprehensive Approach” on the Bucharest Summit
in 2008. The implementation of these conceptual goals, however,
falls far behind. Measured by the input of resources, both
personal and financial means, more than 70 % of the resources –
not only in Germany – raised for Afghanistan are spent for the
military, less than 30 % for civilian purposes. The conceptual
ideas would demand just the opposite.
It was not before the end of 2009 that the international
community defined the concept of handing over responsibility to
the Afghan authorities as a political goal, which seems for the
first time to be achievable militarily. This, however, is
nothing else than an exit option, thus abandoning many of the
ambitious goals of the past.
Whitewashing the Mission by German Politics –
“This is not a War”
In Germany, where the definition of goals and objectives had
been initially rather vague and with some discrepancies the
Federal Government made substantial efforts to enunciate the
goals for participation in the Afghanistan missions. In
so-called “Afghanistan Concepts” –the first one was edited 2003
which is two years after the decision to engage – the government
phrased very ambitious and partly unrealistic goals. In a
country with traditionally decentralized societal structures,
characterized after decades of civil war by poverty, deep ethnic
and religious cleavages, a medieval society in the countryside
and an entire breakdown of state structures it appears somewhat
naive to name goals such as building a strong central government,
modernizing society or democratization in a western sense.
However, politics in Germany needed such “glorified” goals to
justify the military operation to a society with the deep
conviction of a “civilian power”. Therefore, the German
population was deluded by calling it a stabilization mission
with “armed developers” instead of military men and women which
was supported by media coverage in the first years. After NATO-
responsibility for ISAF expanded in 2006 to the whole country,
the distinction between OEF and ISAF diminished within NATO.
Only in Germany, the Federal Government insisted in internal
debates on the position that ISAF was not a combat mission
because such operations were conducted by OEF.
In addition, German politicians refused to use a terminology,
which could get in conflict with the desired image of a
stabilization mission. For the Federal Government German
soldiers were not in a “war”. This had negative effects for the
soldiers because their legal status was in a grey zone, their
equipment was partly not adequate and the rules of engagement
were by 2009 not tailored to their mission. Beginning in 2008
the media brought severe incidents into the awareness of the
population, which indicated that German soldiers were by no
means “armed developers” but were fighting, dying and also
killing in Afghanistan. The highlight of public attention was
the bombing of two fuel trucks near Kundus on 5 September 2009
in which a large number of people died, including children. This
forced the government to stop its whitewashing of the mission
and to acknowledge that the Bundeswehr was fighting in a
non-international armed conflict. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg
and Chancellor Merkel were even using the word “war”.
Parliamentary Army vs. Escalation
In the German society exists the strong feeling that the
Bundeswehr should only be engaged in defending its own country.
Against this background and given the legal situation in Germany
where a lot of power is invested the Bundestag, the question
arises why the German parliament did not make any visible effort
to slow down the escalation of the German military engagement.
How could the Federal Government – cross-linked in diverse
multilateral structures of International Organizations like UN,
NATO or EU – push through its decisions in all 22 mandates in
spite of massive resistance within the population toward the
Here is the answer: although Germany has a Parliamentary Army,
the Federal Government is factually dominating the decision
processes even in parliament.
First, in the German parliamentarian system the control effort
of coalition factions over “their” government is not very
strong. Control functions are more the domain of the opposition.
In times of a “Grand Coalition”, however, which Germany had for
quite a period of time, the opposition is rather weak. And after
a change of the majority ratio in parliament it takes some time
before factions revise positions which they had taken when
supporting a government. Therefore, a “Very Grand Coalition” has
approved most mandates so far.
Second, the government has the power of agenda setting. It is
drafting the mandates and sometimes sets very narrow time limits
for parliamentary discussions; the Bundestag can only approve or
reject the draft without altering the wording (although in the
parliamentary practice the parliament has developed some ways of
influencing the mandate by consultations in advance, by protocol
notes or by time limits).
Third, the government has a substantial information advantage
over the parliamentarians not least due to military
Fourth, the Bundestag in mandate debates has so far gotten lost
in details rather than conducting a strategic discussion of the
goals of German security policy. There have been, for example,
no parliamentary hearings on such issues, as are normal in the
US Congress. Therefore, in spite of the formal rather strong
power of the Bundestag, there are no clear “parliamentarian skid
marks” visible in the German decision processes.
Lessons Learned from the Afghanistan Case
What are the lessons learned from the ten-year adventure of
German Afghanistan missions? The first one is that Germany has
to define its own security interests. This should take place in
a discourse between politics, the academia and societal groups.
As a result, the decision makers would have a benchmark when
discussing an eventual involvement in a military conflict. It is
for example hard to explain why German forces are involved in
Afghanistan, Germany on the other hand refused to contribute to
the NATO mission in Libya.
The second lesson refers to the first decision
on military involvement. The Afghanistan conflict makes it very
clear that such a first decision is crucial. It shows clearly
that having slid into a conflict without proper analysis, having
no clear goals and objectives, there is a great danger for an
escalation and it is problematic to exit. Therefore, decision
makers must take the necessary time to evaluate carefully the
conditions, define the political goals and the military
objectives, make sure that the resources needed are available
and will be for the duration of the mission, and spell out exit
conditions, i.e. criteria for success or failure. These
necessary steps of mission preparation must be gone through even
if expectations of allies and partners and time pressure seem to
call for immediate decisions.
Thirdly, the German Bundestag should develop more critical
parliamentary control in such questions concerning peace and war.
This should include more assertiveness against governmental
pressure, persistence in demanding sufficient information from
the government and development of procedures for a strategic
debate of security issues.
Fourth, the Federal Government and the Bundestag should learn
from the Afghanistan case that they can not whitewash the
character of a military mission with regard to a perceived mood
in the population. Investigative journalism will bring the
reality to light and politicians will loose credibility if they
had tried to disguise their genuine motives.
Afghanistan after 2014
Finally, looking into the crystal ball, what are the
perspectives for the Afghanistan mission after 2014? President
Obama decided – and Germany as well as NATO followed this
decision – to withdraw the combat troops by end of 2014.
Whatever this means. By that timeline, Afghan security forces,
i.e. Afghan National Army and Afghan Police Force, should be
able to take care of the security in their country. In the
latest German mandate, the reduction plan for 2012, is
conditioned by the clause “if the situation allows”. And if not?
The riots in Afghanistan after the burning of Koran books by US
soldiers and the hasty withdrawal of German troops from Taloqan
emphasize the importance of this question.
A further question is whether coalition forces engaged in
partnering missions, i.e. accompanying Afghan units in combat
missions, are combat troops and whether they will stay beyond
2014? On the other hand, will coalition forces with the primary
task to train Afghans participate in fighting if the situation
demands it? These questions show that militarily issues are
still quite nebulous.
Yet, the announcement of withdrawal should enhance the use of
non- military instruments. This would be a step forward in
implementing the Comprehensive Approach NATO agreed on several
years ago. The pledges of the international community made at
the Bonn Conference in 2012 sound promising with this regard.
This article is based on the book by the author
“Die Afghanistaneinsaetze der Bundeswehr – Politischer
Entscheidungsprozess mit Eskalationsdynamik“ (The Afghanistan
Missions of Bundeswehr – Political Decision Process with
Escalation Dynamics“), published 2011 in Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, Germany. For evidence of
statements in this article reference to the book would be
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