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Ing. Salih CAVKIC
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The man of the year

Guy Verhofstadt
Mr. Guy Verhofstadt

The man of the year
L'homme de l'an
De man van het jaar
2009


A proven Democrat, protector and fighter for justice and human rights in the World.

Een bewezen Democraat, beschermer en strijder voor rechtvaardigheid en mensenrechten in de Wereld.

Un prouvé démocrate, protecteur et combattant pour la justice et des droits de l'homme dans le Mond.

Eine bewährte Demokrat, Beschützer und Kämpfer für Gerechtigkeit und Menschenrechte in der Welt.

Dokazani demokrat,
 zaštitnik i borac za pravdu i ljudska prava u Svijetu.





Guarantee
Peace in the World


Mr. Barak Hossein Obama

Guarantee
peace in the world

Garantie
vrede in de wereld

Garantie
la paix dans le monde

Garantie des Friedens in der Welt

Zabezpečenie
mieru vo svete

Garancija
mira u svijetu
 












 


  • Why did Croatia persist?

  • Franjo Tudjman's vision

  • Leadership

  • A European Croatia

  • Telling Croatia's story


Dear friends of ESI,

In the end it seemed almost inevitable.

This weekend two thirds of voters supported Croatia's accession to the European Union as its 28th member. The referendum came after national elections in December in which all main parties had backed joining the EU. It concluded a decade in which all Croatian governments had proceeded on the assumption that there was no alternative to meeting the conditions put forward by the EU to become a full member.

Croatia's negotiating framework, set in place after the rejection of the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands, was more demanding than for any previous applicant. The EU insisted on handing over generals responsible for Croatia's battlefield victories in the 1990s to the ICTY in The Hague. Croatia had to demonstrate that its judicial system could put on trial and convict highly placed officials. It also had to accept binding arbitration concerning its borders with neighbouring Slovenia in the face of what was widely viewed in Croatia as Slovenian blackmail.

Some noted that less than half of all eligible voters participated in the referendum; in fact, given problems with a large number of "dead souls" in the voting registry, and the fact that a large number of Croatian citizens living abroad also did not care to vote, the percentage of resident voters in Croatia who participated appears to have been above 61 percent and thus higher than in the referenda on EU accession in Hungary, Slovenia and Poland. Only 6,123 Bosnian Croats cast ballots - or 2.3 percent of all 413,000 Croatian voters supposedly resident there.


Why did Croatia persist?

Croatia submitted its application in early 2003 to the Greek EU presidency. Europe has since seen a rise in scepticism about enlargement, faced a deepening economic crisis and is even now struggling with an existential challenge in the Euro zone. The fate of Greece and the problems of other members also undermined the confidence that accession was a guarantee of future prosperity.

So why did Croatia's leaders persist? Why did a government led by the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) co-operate with an international criminal court (the ICTY in The Hague) which concluded that Croatia's founding president and first leader of the HDZ, Franjo Tudjman, had been at the helm of a "criminal enterprise" to ethnically cleanse his country of Serbs? Why did HDZ-led governments create conditions in which independent prosecutors indicted a former HDZ prime minister, HDZ deputy prime minister, HDZ minister of defence, HDZ party treasurer, and a large number of well-connected managers in public companies?

And how did the national consensus on the need to implement even painful and costly reforms survive periods of delay, EU hesitation, and the perception of European double-standards? This consensus was put to the test continuously in the powerful parliamentary Committee for Monitoring Accession Negotiations, chaired by an opposition MP (Vesna Pusic), including 15 Croatian parliamentarians, representing all parliamentary parties, with every one of them holding a veto over the negotiating positions for each chapter. Why did not even one try to bring the process to a halt?

To understand this robust national consensus, the HDZ's perseverance and the opposition parties' sustained support to this effort, one has to recall the alternative most Croatians remembered: the situation of the 1990s, before their country embarked on its EU accession process.

Croatia's leaders persisted, because, in the end, they rejected the vision and the policies of the 1990s.


A film for the world, only once shown in Croatia - How Tudjman saw himself


Franjo Tudjman's vision

In 1995, when the war in Bosnia ended, Croatia's president Franjo Tudjman looked like the biggest winner of the Yugoslav conflict. He had led newly independent Croatia through four years of war. By 1998 he had restored Croatian control over all of its territory. Croatia had a powerful army. It was seen as close to the United States. It also still had great influence in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Tudjman turned his attention to ensure that posterity would see him as he saw himself: a heroic father of the nation. He commissioned films and books on his life. He continued to record all of his conversations in the presidential palace. And yet, Tudjman's post-war vision of a bright future quickly came undone. After the Dayton Agreement had been signed he continued to undermine the statehood of neighbouring Bosnia, convinced that its borders were "historically absurd." He was surprised that his former allies expected him to stop funding Croatian extremists in Herzegovina. He had been an early supporter of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, convinced, as he told an associate, that "those who win wars are never tried." Then, in 1998, he realized that the ICTY was investigating atrocities committed by his forces, as well as his own role.

In 1997 the prime minister of Bulgaria, Ivan Kostov, told his parliament that Bulgaria would make every effort to join the European Union within a decade (and in 2007 Bulgaria did indeed join). Croatia did not follow. Tudjman chose isolation instead. In December 1998 he explained in a speech at the military academy that "even now The Hague (ICTY) prepares indictments against you, against us" and that in the face of this the country needed "a united military and people."

Tudjman died in 1999, just before he would have been indicted. No president except Turkey's attended his funeral. The tapes of his conversations in the presidential palace ended up not as proof of historic greatness but as evidence in The Hague.

Until today there is no monument in Zagreb of the man who saw himself as Croatia's George Washington. Soon after his death even his own party stopped evoking his name. And when it tried to draw on Tudjman's legacy in the most recent election campaign, it flopped.


Stipe Mesic – Ivica Racan – Ivo Sanader


Leadership

Even after Tudjman's death, however, Croatia's EU accession was not inevitable. For this a succession of leaders had to make a strategic choice. They also had to take real risks.

The first to do so was Stipe Mesic, a two-time president and successor of Franjo Tudjman. Mesic outlined the vision of Croatia's EU accession in his inaugural speech. In September 2000, some of Croatia's most respected army generals signed an open letter warning that the prosecutions of wartime heroes for alleged war crimes should stop. Within hours Mesic stripped them of their positions. As he told ESI:

"It was not easy to send generals into retirement when everybody was afraid of a coup. But nothing happened. With the army, there is no negotiation."

This was a turning point for Tudjman's security apparatus and the investigation of war crimes.

Ivica Racan, Croatia's last communist leader who became prime minister after Tudjman's death, submitted Croatia's EU membership application in 2003. Racan also, crucially, ended Croatian support for hardliners in neighbouring Bosnia.

The most surprising role was played by Tudjman's successor at the head of the HDZ, however: the polyglot Ivo Sanader. Under his leadership the HDZ returned to power on a nationalist platform in late 2003. Once in charge, however, his government turned its back on Tudjman's legacy on all crucial issues that had kept Croatia isolated in the 1990s. Sanader intensified co-operation with the ICTY. He handed over all indictees still wanted by the tribunal, including senior generals. He included a Croatian Serb party in his coalition government. He continued to support Bosnia's territorial integrity. And he made EU integration the overriding priority for his government. In 2005 Croatia opened accession talks. In 2009 Croatia joined NATO.

Sanader's successor as prime minister, Jadranka Kosor (also HDZ), faced a different strategic choice. The EU insisted on serious reform of the judicial system. Kosor accepted its demands. Laws and rules were changed to empower prosecutors. A spectacular series of arrests and trials began. Investigators caught up with her predecessor, Ivo Sanader, who was arrested in 2010. They even caught up with her party. This was one reason HDZ lost control. It also was crucial to enable Kosor to sign the accession treaty in late 2011: these trials had convinced sceptics in the EU that change in the judiciary was real.

Today Ivo Sanader stands trial in Zagreb on charges of major corruption. Even his biggest political opponents note, however, that without his success in transforming the HDZ, turning its back to Tudjman's vision, Croatia would not have made the progress it did.


Vesna Pusic


A European Croatia

Compared to where it stood in 1999, Croatia is undoubtedly a story of a successful transformation. It is also evidence that the strict EU negotiating framework, which will also be employed in for future accessions, can bring results.

A few weeks ago Vesna Pusic, for many years a crusader for EU integration in the Croatian parliament, today Croatia's new foreign minister, told ESI that

"If you look at Croatia the way it was ten, eleven years ago and the way it looks now, it is a different country in every aspect. I can say with absolute certainty that it is a different country because of the EU accession process."

Pusic also stressed:

"Our experience is that it is almost impossible for somebody to help you if you cannot help yourself first."

Croatia's is an experience that also other Balkan countries would do well to study.

(For a portrait of and interview with Vesna Pusic, including her take on Croatian lessons for other Balkan countries, go here. For an interview on the eve of the December 2011 elections with the incoming prime minister, Zoran Milanovic, go here.)


ESI analysts working on Croatia: Kristof Bender, Snjezana Vukic, Besa Shahini



Telling Croatia's story

In coming weeks ESI will put a lot more on Croatia on our website. This is part of our Future of Enlargement Project run by ESI deputy chairman Kristof Bender and supported by ERSTE Foundation in Vienna.

We are preparing, led in Zagreb by ESI analyst Snjezana Vukic, a new documentary to be broadcast later this year within the award-winning Return to Europe series in co-operation with the Austrian Broadcasting Association ORF and Geyerhalter Productions.

Together with the Bosnian think tank Populari, ESI analysts, including senior analyst Besa Shahini, are analysing how the new negotiating framework for accession has worked to transform the Croatian administration in selected areas, with case studies of reforms in the vital environment and food safety sectors; exploring what it would take for other countries, including Bosnia, to follow suit (for more on this project go here).

There are many more lessons both the EU and the region can learn from Croatia's trajectory since 1999. The most important is reassuring in times like these: EU soft power and conditionality, linked to a credible accession process, remains a powerful motor of change even today.

Best regards,



Gerald Knaus

Further reading
ESI – Populari Project on lessons from Croatia's reforms for Bosnia
Zoran Milanovic, Croatia's new Prime Minister (new ESI Interview)
Vesna Pusic, Croatia's new Foreign Minister (new ESI portrait and interview)
Stipe Mesic, former Croatian President (new ESI portrait)
Ivica Racan, former Croatian Prime Minister (new ESI portrait)
ESI Croatia page
The Future of EU Enlargement webpage
ERSTE Foundation
Feedback
As always, we are looking forward to your feedback. However, please do not reply directly to this message but send your comments to feedback@esiweb.org.

Contact
European Stability Initiative (ESI)
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GERMANY

Tel: +49 30 53214455
Fax: +49 30 53214457
E-mail: info@esiweb.org
Website: www.esiweb.org

© European Stability Initiative (ESI)
 


World Security Network reporting from Bonn in Germany, January 24, 2012

Dear Cavkic Salih,

GCC Foreign Ministers. "Power based on traditional legitimacy continues to play a stabilizing role in the transformation of societies and their political systems. Traditional hereditary rule seems to be able to maintain power with more respect, possibly even with acquired legitimacy, and with lesser need for the exercise of violence against its own citizens."

Revolutions are not processes of social engineering. They unfold as an intrinsically unpredictable flow of events. Structurally, revolutions will go through phases, often through contradictory periods. Hardly any revolution will evolve without turbulences and phases of consolidation. And: Revolutions do not happen without moments of stagnation, surprising advancement and unexpected transformation.

I.

The beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 has not been of a different nature. It started as a fundamental surprise to most, took different turns in different countries and was far from being over by the end of 2011. Transatlantic partners are fully aware of the stark differences among Arab countries. They realize the genuine nature of each nation's struggle for democracy. Yet, they are inclined to take the Western experience with democracy as key bench mark for judging current progress in the Arab world. The constitutional promise of the US or the success of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989/90 is inspiring, yet also calls for caution in judging and projecting the Arab Spring. Preconditions have to be taken into account. Beside, the history of Europe's 19th and 20th century also suggest room for failure in the process of moving toward rule of law and participatory democracy. Some cynics have already suggested that the Arab Spring could be followed by an Arab Autumn or even Winter. Even if one discards such previsions as inappropriate self-fulfilling prophecy, certain European experiences should probably not be forgotten:

  • In the 1830s, Germany experienced its own Spring toward pluralism and democracy, then called “Vormärz”. That German spring movement ("Sturm und Drang") was essentially a cultural uprising without the follow-up of transformational political change.

  • In 1848, across Europe revolutionary upheavals promoted the hope for an early parliamentary constitutionalism across the continent. In most places, this hope was soon to be replaced by variants of a restrictive consolidation of the ancient regimes.

  • In 1989, the experience of Romania deviated bly from most of the peaceful revolutions across Europe. Ousting and even killing the former dictator was a camouflage for the old regime to prevail for almost another decade. While the rest of Central and South Eastern Europe struggled with regime change and renewal, Romania prolonged regime atrophy and resistance to renewal.

No matter what direction the Arab Spring may take in the months and years ahead, two trends are startling for now:

 

1. The Arab Spring has initiated a wide range of different reactions and trends in each of the Arab countries. The assumption of a homogenous Arab world has become a myth. Likewise, the assumption of permanently stagnant and immobile Arab societies has become a myth. The quest for dignity, voice and inclusion under rule of law and a true structure of social pluralism has been the signature of peaceful protest all over the Arab world. The reactions of incumbent regimes have demonstrated a variety of strategies, but also different levels of strength, legitimacy and criminal energy.

2. Most surprising has been the relative resilience of the Arab monarchies to the Arab Spring: Morocco and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain have been reasonably unaffected and stable (in spite of the temporary clashes in Bahrain and their oppression with the help of Saudi-Arabia’s army).While the quest for dignity, voice and inclusion has posed a challenge to all regimes in the Arab world, Arab monarchies emerged relatively undisturbed from the first wave of popular unrest and protest. This contrasts with the protest against personal rule in most Arab republics: The flight of a corrupt President whose security apparatus was no longer predictable (Tunisia), the arrest of a deposed President who seemed to be in fullest command of its security apparatus, but could not maintain support of his army (Egypt), the semi-deposition of a ruler who was torn between security factions and split traditional loyalties (Yemen), the criminal attack on its own people by the security forces loyal to a beleaguered President (Syria), the oppression of all potential unrest by an old regime still in its last sight of absolute power (Algeria), and the launching of a war by a delegitimized ruler against his own people (Libya) were variations of a complex theme across Arab republics. Lebanon has been a special case for years, with its own transformational revolution (“Cedar Revolution”) going on since 2005. Iraq and Sudan have also been of a unique character due to their specific domestic and geopolitical constellation.

How can one explain the almost paradoxical phenomenon that hereditary monarchies - at least for the time being - seem to be less affected by the protest against personal rule and patrimonial authoritarianism that has resonated across the Arab world? One initial observation is undeniable: Saudi-Arabia is particularly interested in supporting Arab monarchies and it is doing so with an enormous amount of money. In fact, Saudi Arabia may even be interested in preventing too far-reaching democratization in Arab republics. But the vested interests of the Saudi family alone do not explain why Arab monarchies tend to be more resilient to the current wave of protest to be heard all over the Arab world. One has to go beyond the obvious and look for structural explanations. Most evident - and well beyond the Arab world - is the fact that power based on traditional legitimacy continues to play a stabilizing role in the transformation of societies and their political systems. Usually, republican authoritarian personal rule built on a political ideology (i.e. independence, socialism, nationalism, development) can only be maintained through a security apparatus and the pressure it can exert on a rising popular demand for change. In contrast, traditional hereditary rule seems to be able to maintain power with more respect, possibly even with acquired legitimacy, and with lesser need for the exercise of violence against its own citizens. The most interesting question stemming from this observation is as follows: do we know what it may take for monarchies to be successful over time? It is not enough to simply recall the religious rooting of Arab monarchical legitimacy as it is especially the case in Saudi-Arabia and in Morocco. No matter their religious or similar moral-based authority: The historic record of monarchies confronted with the pressure for change is mixed. Reference to traditional religious sources of legitimacy has not been enough for several monarchies to survive the winds of change their societies where confronted with. While going beyond this perspective, several insights into the nature of hereditary rule that has stood the test of societal change are pertinent and may serve as a useful mirror to be kept in mind as the future path of hereditary rule in the Arab world is unfolding.

II.

Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, Director of the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at Bonn University in Germany and a member of the International Advisory Board of the World Security Network Foundation:"What can we learn from the survival of consolidated monarchies: 1. No warfare with or threat of violence toward any neighbor. 2. Turn from a rule of fear into a symbol of respect and national unity. 3. Separate authority from power. 4. Disassociate personal wealth from the wealth of the country."

The historic record of hereditary rule when confronted with the challenges of social, political or economic transformation or even revolution has not been all too impressive. From the 17th century (Great Britain) to the 19th century (France, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Mexico) and to 20th century (Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, China, Greece, Cambodia, Persia, Nepal, Egypt, Libya, Iraq) more monarchies were toppled than rebuild whenever their societies were fundamentally transformed. The current European hereditary monarchies (United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg, Monaco, Liechtenstein) as well as non-European monarchies (Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, Bhutan, Cambodia, Tonga, Lesotho, Swaziland plus the Arab monarchies) are rather the exception to the rule – the global trend seems to favor republican political order as the answer to socio-economic and political modernization. However, restorations in Great Britain (17th century) and in Spain (20th century) as well as the transformation of Imperial rule in Japan after 1945 indicate the potential for the revival of hereditary rule in times of great upheaval. The panorama of an ongoing survival of almost two dozen monarchies and systems of hereditary rules should not forget the more than two thousand year old electoral monarchy of the Catholic Church. After all, the Pope is also head of state of the Vatican.

What are the main lessons to be drawn from the survival or revival of hereditary rule elsewhere that could be of inspirational insight for the future of contemporary Arab hereditary rulers?

1. No warfare with or threat of violence toward any neighbor. Consolidated monarchies across the world have recognized the legitimacy of borders and the sovereign rights of their neighbors. This, in turn, has helped consolidated monarchies to stay out of international conflicts over territory or power.

For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply that for the sake of their own interest they would be well advised to search for peace with Israel; to recognize Israel and to facilitate a two-state solution which would allow Israel to live in security and an independent Palestinian State to live in decency without any border dispute between either of the two states and between them and the Arab monarchies.

2. Turn from a rule of fear into a symbol of respect and national unity. Consolidated monarchies have been able to disconnect the court from the national security apparatus and to project themselves as benevolent symbol of national unity, sometimes coupled with a certain religious authority.

For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply to transfer security forces and the military to full parliamentary control; to initiate lustration processes aimed at bringing to justice past crimes of the security apparatus without deconstructing the security apparatus as such; to introduce strict rule of law also over all security forces and military authorities without sidelining them from the future processes of society and politics.

3. Separate authority from power. Consolidated monarchies have decoupled their traditional authority from the daily business of politics and the structure of national power. They have accepted an independent government and parliamentary rule as the main source of national political power. Consolidated monarchies have surrendered their power to constitutional rule and thus maintained their symbolic and traditional authority.

For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply to empower parliamentary governance through a prime ministerial system with full accountability to the respective parliamentary majority; to terminate the appointment of prime ministers or members of parliaments, including the Upper House; to initiate a process of rewriting the national constitution aimed at properly organizing a new national consensus framed by a constitution-based parliamentary monarchy.

4. Disassociate personal wealth from the wealth of the country. In consolidated monarchies, the personal budget of the monarch and the court has been disconnected from the sources of wealth of the country. The budget of today's monarchs may still be less accountable than other elements of public spending, but the allocation of the court's budget in consolidated monarchies is no longer based on the ruler's arbitrary access to public goods.

For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply to separate state funds from the funds available for the monarch and his entourage; to install parliamentary control over the allocation of resources for the hereditary sovereign and a solid system of accountability for auditing these resources.

III.

Protesters in Bahrain in 2011. "Arab hereditary rulers would be well advised to address key structural challenges such as promoting a pluralistic civil society, b legal sector reforms and private investment that are vital for a peaceful and sustainable transformation in their respective society."

The path to constitutional and parliamentary monarchy among those countries that have been able to successfully transform from personal rule to parliamentary monarchy has always been long and often arduous. In most cases, it went through similar stages, worth being recalled as the Arab Spring unfolds.

1. Originally, personal rule was based on control of territory and people. Gradually, intermediary elites were installed by the ruler or emerged against the initial will of the ruler. In a long process, they advanced the notion of legal rule over personal rule (i.e. Magna Carta). Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to respond to the quest for freedom and justice from within their citizenry with a sustained support of independent legal structures.

2. The growing diversification of economic activities - especially the emergence of capital-based production and division of labor - generated functional elites (bankers, owners of trading houses and production) with growing demand for political inclusion and participation. Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to support the establishment of independent representation of functional elites (including business associations and trade unions) recognized as a genuine sphere of open and legitimate political discourse with the objective to fully participate in the public policy dialogue.

3. The claims of a new bourgeoisie for political inclusion led to an advanced rule of law and opened the way for democratic participation which in turn stabilized the socio-political system (middle class). Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to do their utmost to help their societies moving beyond the prevailing oligarchic structures, often of a rent-seeking mindset. It is here that the experience of Turkey's economic development may be a source of inspiration for the transformation necessary in the Arab world, beyond the Arab monarchies.

4. Time and again, parliamentary rule came under pressure by the aspiration of personal rule in the name of contingent social, cultural and intellectual ideas and ideologies. However, no republican dictator was ever able to exercise the “natural” features of traditional rule over such a long time that he could translate his rule into legitimate hereditary succession. Today, North Korea’s ruling family and the ruling family of Assad in Syria – and in a limited way the regimes of Kabila in Congo and of Ali Bongo in Gabon – are the exception to this rule. Yet, these contemporary hereditary dictatorships have been unable to generate legitimacy for their specific version of authoritarian or pseudo-democratic hereditary succession. A democratic exception to this phenomenon is provided by the current situation in Singapore: the first prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s son is the countries respected and legitimate third Prime Minister, Lee Hysien Loong. Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to disconnect any family member from public offices that ought to be mandated by the authorized government which, in turn, should be held accountable by the respective parliament.

5. Most personal and patrimonial rulers in post-colonial societies did resort to similar mechanisms of maintaining their position: patronage, clientelism, theft, corruption, crime and violence usually were the most prominent features. As republican dictators are lacking the features of traditional authority, they try to resort to charismatic rule, violence and coercion, none of which can generate the necessary features required for transition toward legitimate hereditary succession. Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to match political openness and transparency with personal modesty and decency in spending behavior.

For now, the best source of authority of contemporary monarchies in the Arab world (and elsewhere) is the traditional legitimacy attributed to their rule. Besides a reflection on the insights drawn from other consolidated monarchies in today's world, the current Arab hereditary rulers would be well advised to address key structural challenges that are vital for a peaceful and sustainable transformation in their respective society:

1. Consolidate open spaces in which a pluralistic civil society can thrive. Relate these open spaces to the political arena and include open political spaces into the national dialogue on constitutional reform.

2. Rehabilitate the authority of the public sphere by promoting multi-party systems. Election thresholds of 3 to 5 percent ought to guarantee that these multi-party systems help consolidating the new constitutional consensus.

3. Promote b legal sector reforms including all levels of the judiciary and the penitentiary system. Initiate public education programs that raise the awareness of the primacy of rule of law over any system of personal patronage, coercion or arbitrariness.

4. Most importantly: Promote private investment – both domestic and international - with the prime aim of providing sustainable employment opportunities for the young generation. In the end, only a stable middle class based on qualified and appropriate means of education and vocational training can guarantee long-term stability in any Arab society.

IV.

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU, and Amr Moussa, former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. "Transatlantic partners will have to re-define their strategies toward the Arab world. They ought to devise a joint strategy to engage Arab monarchies in multifold processes of transformation aimed at advancing the reality of consolidated, legitimate and modernized monarchies that eventually accept the frame of parliamentary constitutionalism.

The Arab Spring has opened a new chapter in the political history of the Arab world. The outcome is far from predictable. It may vary from country to country and it may drag on with different speed and intensity for years, if not for decades. But a beginning has been made thanks to the courage of non-violent people, who want to revitalize their societies on the basis of dignity, freedom and justice. In a geopolitical context, the historic opportunity which the Arab Spring represents will, at least, lead to two fundamental reconfigurations:

1. The traditional prejudice according to which Africa is divided between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa will fall. The issue of overcoming personal rule and introducing constitutional change aimed at enabling rule of law-based pluralistic democracy is as pertinent in most of Sub-Saharan Africa as it is in the Arab World. In both regions the issue reflects the deficits of post-colonial politics. Hence, the uprising of the Arab Spring has been watched with great intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa, with enthusiasm among young people and with worry among some of the petrified post-colonial elites. The Arab Spring will repeat itself in several sub-Saharan societies. There, it will most likely bring about the same mixed picture of success, stagnation and failure as we see in the Arab world. Thus, it will support the trend (and the need) for a differentiated perception of Africa. Instead of continuously and erroneously imagining Africa as one, the long-term constitutional effect of the Arab Spring will help to distinguish between an emerging Africa of successful political transformation beyond the post-colonial era, and a stagnating Africa that remains trapped in post-colonial structures of personal rule and patrimonialism.

2. Transatlantic partners will have to re-define their strategies toward the Arab world. Neither policies of fear and stereotypes based on distorted notions of identity nor attitudes of benevolent paternalism will help to redefine American and European relations with the Arab societies and their emerging new political structures. Transatlantic partners need to engage the Arab world – and eventually Africa, too – into a comprehensive agenda of transformation.

As for the transatlantic partners, it will be necessary to move beyond the traditional security paradigm. For a long time, Arab monarchies were considered Western security partners based on geopolitical considerations with little consideration for domestic issues. In the future, the Arab monarchies can be stable security partners of the West if their legitimate domestic stability provides the ground for predictable international behavior. The necessary transformation processes will accompany Arab hereditary rulers for many years to come. Transatlantic partners ought to engage Arab monarchies in multifold processes of transformation aimed at advancing the reality of consolidated, legitimate and modernized monarchies that eventually accept the frame of parliamentary constitutionalism. The notion of parliamentary monarchy may be new to Arab hereditary systems. It is, however, not impossible to achieve such a stage as other monarchies around the world have proven. In fact, it may well be the only realistic option for Arab monarchies to prevail over time.

Currently, the transatlantic partners pursue independent strategies of cooperation with the Arab world. In spite of a b normative overlap, their strategies also represent different interests and genuine approaches. The enormous challenge of the current opening of the Arab political space should be seen as a golden opportunity for both the United States and the European Union to define a joint strategy of their future engagement with the Arab world. Its formative ideas should be transformation and legitimacy, its long term objectives stability and partnership, and its driving instruments geared at promoting civil society and the private sector.

Some monarchies went through stages of transformation that stretched over centuries. The hereditary rulers in the Arab world may not have so much time. What is truly new of the events of 2011 is the spirit of the Arab Spring: self-empowerment of Arab societies, bringing back dignity and hope to frustrated and marginalized societies, enabling millions of citizens to act as proud, self-confident and open partners of their neighbors. This might only be the first step in a long, complex and often vexed journey. Currently, the main focus among transatlantic partners is on the future of Arab republics which are torn between the most extreme possible scenarios. Some may think that Arab monarchies will be the last to reform and hence can be neglected right now. There are good reasons to argue for the opposite. Unreformed Arab monarchies could undermine any progress currently made in Arab republics. But reformed, transformed and consolidated Arab monarchies could become reliable agents for change and legitimacy in a renewed Arab world.


Prof. Dr. Ludger Kuehnhardt
Director of the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at the University of Bonn in Germany
Member of the WSN International Advisory Board

 



Former EU Parliament President Hans-Gert Poettering MEP on Democracy in the Arab World

Hans-Gert Poettering, Former EU Parliament President, on democracy in the Arab world.


Former EU Parliament President Hans-Gert Poettering MEP on progress in Libya and the Israel/Palestine conflict



Hans-Gert Poettering, Former EU Parliament President, on progress in Libya and the Israel/Palestine conflict.



 


BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - BOSNA i HERCEGOVINA

[Klick voor Nederlands]

A Public Announcement

about the demand to oppose the totalitarian government and its politics versus the man
 

Mr. Mirnes Ajanovic Mr. Sakib Balic

The president of the BOSS, Mr. Mirnes Ajanovic, is warning that he tragic death of a veteran Mr. Sakib Balic, which is the result of self-immolation for hopelessness caused by the inhuman politics of the ruling parties has to be a warning to everyone not to allow further continuation of the totalitarian government and its politics versus the man.
The revolution is the only way to confront the political dictators, who recklessly make decisions about people’s destinies in order to achieve their own profit-making interests.
The president of the BOSS, Mr. Mirnes Ajanovic, is appealing, saying that it is the final time that all the union, veteran’s, non-governmental, senior citizens’ and opposition political organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with support from the independent media, unite in the resistance to the ruling totalitarianism.

Mr. Muamer Dedic, the BOSS Press
www.boss.ba; press@boss.ba

January 12th, 2012


GERMANY - DEUTSCHLAND
 

Virus Scan - Screenshot eines Security Scans. Quelle: imago
 

Deutsche Bundesamt warnt vor Schadprogramm
Computernutzer sollen dringend ihre Rechner checken

von Alfred Krüger
[Klick voor Nederlands]
 

Zehntausende deutsche Rechner sind mit dem Schadprogramm "DNS-Changer" infiziert. Der Schädling hat die Netzwerkeinstellungen manipuliert. Das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik rät zum Selbsttest auf einer offiziellen Behördenseite. ZDF Nachricht: http://www.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/9/0,3672,8448041,00.html, von 11.01.2012

MEDIATHEK
Video Datenklau am Hotspot
Oliver Achten mit Notebook im CafeDie "Operation Ghost Click" dauerte zwei Jahre. Anfang November 2011 schlug das FBI in Estland zu. Die estnische Polizei verhaftete sechs Männer und eine Frau im Alter von 26 bis 31 Jahren. Ihnen wurde vorgeworfen, ein Botnetz betrieben und weltweit mehr als vier Millionen Rechner mit dem Schadprogramm "DNS-Changer" infiziert zu haben - darunter auch mindestens 33.000 deutsche Rechner.


BSI empfiehlt Schnelltest

Die internationalen Ermittlungen wurde am 7. November offiziell beendet. Doch das kriminelle Treiben der siebenköpfigen Cybergang wirkt noch heute nach. Denn auf vielen Rechnern ist der "DNS-Changer" noch aktiv. Deren Besitzer merken davon nichts. Das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) und das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) empfehlen deshalb allen Usern, ihre Rechner umgehend zu überprüfen.

Neue Schadsoftware im Internet

BKA und BSI haben schnell reagiert und zusammen mit der Deutschen Telekom die Webseite www.dns-ok.de(Externer Link - Öffnet in neuem Fenster) ins Netz gestellt. Hier kann jeder Internetnutzer kostenlos und sekundenschnell testen, ob sein Rechner noch immer mit dem gefährlichen Schädling infiziert ist. Einfaches Ansurfen der Webseite reicht aus. Sofort wird angezeigt, ob der PC den "DNS-Changer" beherbergt.

Manipulierte Netzverbindungen

Der Schädling hat es in sich. Er konfiguriert befallene Rechner so um, dass bei allen Surftouren statt der regulären DNS-Server etwa der Deutschen Telekom ein manipulierter DNS-Server mit Standort in Rumänien aufgerufen wird. Betroffen sind nicht nur Windows-PCs, sondern laut BSI auch Rechner der Marke Apple

DNS-Server stellen über das Internet die Verbindung zwischen zwei Rechnern her. Sie arbeiten wie Vermittlungsstellen und liefern zu jeder Webadresse, die man im Browser eingibt, die IP-Adresse des Servers, auf dem die fragliche Webseite gespeichert ist. Anschließend verbinden sie automatisch weiter. Das alles geht so schnell, dass der Nutzer von diesen Vorgängen nichts bemerkt

14 Millionen Euro ergaunert

Die Cyberkriminellen aus Estland arbeiteten mit einem einfachen, aber äußerst wirksamen Trick. Sie hatten die "Webadressbücher" in ihrem DNS-Server so manipuliert, dass sie jeden Surfer auf Webseiten ihrer Wahl lenken konnten. Statt der eigentlich gewünschten Webseite wurden die infizierten Rechner auf völlig andere Seiten umgeleitet.

Die Betrüger hatten sich als Werbevermittler getarnt und kassierten für jeden Surfer, den sie auf bestimmte Webportale lenkten, eine Provision. Solche Provisionen sind in der Online-Werbebranche durchaus an der Tagesordnung, nicht jedoch die Methode, mit der die Provisionen ergaunert wurden. Innerhalb von zwei Jahren erwirtschafteten die estnischen Betrüger mit dieser und weiteren Betrugsmaschen mehr als 14 Millionen Euro.

Server werden abgeschaltet

Nach der Festnahme der Betrüger wurden die manipulierten Server durch korrekt arbeitende DNS-Server ersetzt. Hätte man die rumänischen Server sofort abgeschaltet, wäre "bei den betroffenen Rechnern (...) eine Internetnutzung" nicht mehr möglich gewesen, sagt das BKA. Vier Millionen Nutzer - darunter auch staatliche Stellen und sogar die US-Weltraumbehörde NASA - hätten dann keinen Zugang mehr zum Internet gehabt.

Am 8. März 2012 sollen die fraglichen DNS-Server nun endgültig abgeschaltet werden. Betroffene Nutzer, auf deren Rechnern sich immer noch der "DNS-Changer" befindet, können dann keine Webseiten mehr aufrufen. "Daher sollten Internetnutzer die Überprüfung und gegebenenfalls Reinigung ihres Rechners möglichst bald durchführen", rät das BKA.

Hilfe auf botfrei.de

Nutzer, die mit Hilfe des Tests auf der Webseite www.dns-ok.de(Externer Link - Öffnet in neuem Fenster) erfahren, dass ihr Rechner infiziert ist, erhalten dort weiterführende Informationen. "Zur Reinigung des Rechners können die Betroffenen beispielsweise die unter www.botfrei.de(Externer Link - Öffnet in neuem Fenster) bereit gestellten Programme wie den 'DE-Cleaner' nutzen", raten BSI und BKA

 


World Security Network reporting from London in the United Kingdom, January 08, 2012


Dear Cavkic Salih,
 

Field Marshal The Rt. Hon. The Lord Inge: a real British army officer and a gentleman with a British sense of humour, a world-view and inner power and musicality knows the world well from many visits abroad, and is a fresh thinker. He is the last officer to be promoted to the historic title of Field Marshal, as the government and Her Majesty no longer honour generals with this rank.

When you want to meet a real British army officer and a gentleman with a British sense of humour, a world-view and inner power and musicality, the best option is a lunch in the House of Lords with Field Marshal The Rt. Hon. The Lord Inge.

I admire him not because of his impressive titles and his excellent career, but because he can think around the corner like the Chinese, knows the world well from many visits abroad, and is a fresh thinker.

He is the last officer to be promoted to the historic title of Field Marshal, as the government and Her Majesty no longer honour generals with this rank.

Peter Inge was the Chief of the General Staff, the head of the British Army, between 1992 and 1994, and then served as Chief of Defence Staff before his retirement in 1997. In 1989 he became the Commander of NATO’s Northern Army Group and Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine in Germany.

After stepping down as Chief of the Defence Staff, he was created a life peer as Baron Inge, of Richmond in the County of North Yorkshire. In 2002 he was appointed as one of the 24 Knights of the Garter.

As a member of the International Advisory Board of the World Security Network Foundation he has a special interest in the support of the young elite in defence and foreign affairs and the situation in MENA and Afghanistan/Pakistan.

He gave an interview for WSN TV with his views on Libya and the development in MENA and the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.


Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann
President and Founder
World Security Network Foundation

 


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