Ing. Salih CAVKIC
orbus editor in chief
Why did Croatia persist?
Franjo Tudjman's vision
A European Croatia
Telling Croatia's story
Why did Croatia persist?
Dear friends of ESI,
In the end it seemed almost inevitable.
This weekend two thirds of voters supported Croatia's accession to
the European Union as its 28th member. The referendum came after
national elections in December in which all main parties had backed
joining the EU. It concluded a decade in which all Croatian
governments had proceeded on the assumption that there was no
alternative to meeting the conditions put forward by the EU to
become a full member.
Croatia's negotiating framework, set in place after the rejection of
the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands, was more
demanding than for any previous applicant. The EU insisted on
handing over generals responsible for Croatia's battlefield
victories in the 1990s to the ICTY in The Hague. Croatia had to
demonstrate that its judicial system could put on trial and convict
highly placed officials. It also had to accept binding arbitration
concerning its borders with neighbouring Slovenia in the face of
what was widely viewed in Croatia as Slovenian blackmail.
Some noted that less than half of all eligible voters participated
in the referendum; in fact, given problems with a large number of
"dead souls" in the voting registry, and the fact that a large
number of Croatian citizens living abroad also did not care to vote,
the percentage of resident voters in Croatia who participated
appears to have been above 61 percent and thus higher than in the
referenda on EU accession in Hungary, Slovenia and Poland. Only
6,123 Bosnian Croats cast ballots - or 2.3 percent of all 413,000
Croatian voters supposedly resident there.
Croatia submitted its application in early 2003 to the Greek EU
presidency. Europe has since seen a rise in scepticism about
enlargement, faced a deepening economic crisis and is even now
struggling with an existential challenge in the Euro zone. The fate
of Greece and the problems of other members also undermined the
confidence that accession was a guarantee of future prosperity.
So why did Croatia's leaders persist? Why did a government led by
the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) co-operate with an international
criminal court (the ICTY in The Hague) which concluded that
Croatia's founding president and first leader of the HDZ, Franjo
Tudjman, had been at the helm of a "criminal enterprise" to
ethnically cleanse his country of Serbs? Why did HDZ-led governments
create conditions in which independent prosecutors indicted a former
HDZ prime minister, HDZ deputy prime minister, HDZ minister of
defence, HDZ party treasurer, and a large number of well-connected
managers in public companies?
And how did the national consensus on the need to implement even
painful and costly reforms survive periods of delay, EU hesitation,
and the perception of European double-standards? This consensus was
put to the test continuously in the powerful parliamentary Committee
for Monitoring Accession Negotiations, chaired by an opposition MP (Vesna
Pusic), including 15 Croatian parliamentarians, representing all
parliamentary parties, with every one of them holding a veto over
the negotiating positions for each chapter. Why did not even one try
to bring the process to a halt?
To understand this robust national consensus, the HDZ's perseverance
and the opposition parties' sustained support to this effort, one
has to recall the alternative most Croatians remembered: the
situation of the 1990s, before their country embarked on its EU
Croatia's leaders persisted, because, in the end, they rejected the
vision and the policies of the 1990s.
A film for the world, only once shown in Croatia - How Tudjman saw
Franjo Tudjman's vision
In 1995, when the war in Bosnia ended, Croatia's president Franjo
Tudjman looked like the biggest winner of the Yugoslav conflict. He
had led newly independent Croatia through four years of war. By 1998
he had restored Croatian control over all of its territory. Croatia
had a powerful army. It was seen as close to the United States. It
also still had great influence in neighbouring Bosnia and
Tudjman turned his attention to ensure that posterity would see him
as he saw himself: a heroic father of the nation. He commissioned
films and books on his life. He continued to record all of his
conversations in the presidential palace. And yet, Tudjman's
post-war vision of a bright future quickly came undone. After the
Dayton Agreement had been signed he continued to undermine the
statehood of neighbouring Bosnia, convinced that its borders were
"historically absurd." He was surprised that his former allies
expected him to stop funding Croatian extremists in Herzegovina. He
had been an early supporter of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, convinced, as he told an associate, that
"those who win wars are never tried." Then, in 1998, he realized
that the ICTY was investigating atrocities committed by his forces,
as well as his own role.
In 1997 the prime minister of Bulgaria, Ivan Kostov, told his
parliament that Bulgaria would make every effort to join the
European Union within a decade (and in 2007 Bulgaria did indeed
join). Croatia did not follow. Tudjman chose isolation instead. In
December 1998 he explained in a speech at the military academy that
"even now The Hague (ICTY) prepares indictments against you, against
us" and that in the face of this the country needed "a united
military and people."
Tudjman died in 1999, just before he would have been indicted. No
president except Turkey's attended his funeral. The tapes of his
conversations in the presidential palace ended up not as proof of
historic greatness but as evidence in The Hague.
Until today there is no monument in Zagreb of the man who saw
himself as Croatia's George Washington. Soon after his death even
his own party stopped evoking his name. And when it tried to draw on
Tudjman's legacy in the most recent election campaign, it flopped.
Stipe Mesic – Ivica Racan – Ivo Sanader
Even after Tudjman's death, however, Croatia's EU accession was not
inevitable. For this a succession of leaders had to make a strategic
choice. They also had to take real risks.
The first to do so was Stipe Mesic, a two-time president and
successor of Franjo Tudjman. Mesic outlined the vision of Croatia's
EU accession in his inaugural speech. In September 2000, some of
Croatia's most respected army generals signed an open letter warning
that the prosecutions of wartime heroes for alleged war crimes
should stop. Within hours Mesic stripped them of their positions. As
he told ESI:
"It was not easy to send generals into retirement when everybody was
afraid of a coup. But nothing happened. With the army, there is no
This was a turning point for Tudjman's security apparatus and the
investigation of war crimes.
Ivica Racan, Croatia's last communist leader who became prime
minister after Tudjman's death, submitted Croatia's EU membership
application in 2003. Racan also, crucially, ended Croatian support
for hardliners in neighbouring Bosnia.
The most surprising role was played by Tudjman's successor at the
head of the HDZ, however: the polyglot Ivo Sanader. Under his
leadership the HDZ returned to power on a nationalist platform in
late 2003. Once in charge, however, his government turned its back
on Tudjman's legacy on all crucial issues that had kept Croatia
isolated in the 1990s. Sanader intensified co-operation with the
ICTY. He handed over all indictees still wanted by the tribunal,
including senior generals. He included a Croatian Serb party in his
coalition government. He continued to support Bosnia's territorial
integrity. And he made EU integration the overriding priority for
his government. In 2005 Croatia opened accession talks. In 2009
Croatia joined NATO.
Sanader's successor as prime minister, Jadranka Kosor (also HDZ),
faced a different strategic choice. The EU insisted on serious
reform of the judicial system. Kosor accepted its demands. Laws and
rules were changed to empower prosecutors. A spectacular series of
arrests and trials began. Investigators caught up with her
predecessor, Ivo Sanader, who was arrested in 2010. They even caught
up with her party. This was one reason HDZ lost control. It also was
crucial to enable Kosor to sign the accession treaty in late 2011:
these trials had convinced sceptics in the EU that change in the
judiciary was real.
Today Ivo Sanader stands trial in Zagreb on charges of major
corruption. Even his biggest political opponents note, however, that
without his success in transforming the HDZ, turning its back to
Tudjman's vision, Croatia would not have made the progress it did.
A European Croatia
Compared to where it stood in 1999, Croatia is undoubtedly a story
of a successful transformation. It is also evidence that the strict
EU negotiating framework, which will also be employed in for future
accessions, can bring results.
A few weeks ago Vesna Pusic, for many years a crusader for EU
integration in the Croatian parliament, today Croatia's new foreign
minister, told ESI that
"If you look at Croatia the way it was ten, eleven years ago and the
way it looks now, it is a different country in every aspect. I can
say with absolute certainty that it is a different country because
of the EU accession process."
Pusic also stressed:
"Our experience is that it is almost impossible for somebody to help
you if you cannot help yourself first."
Croatia's is an experience that also other Balkan countries would do
well to study.
(For a portrait of and interview with Vesna Pusic, including her
take on Croatian lessons for other Balkan countries, go here. For an
interview on the eve of the December 2011 elections with the
incoming prime minister, Zoran Milanovic, go here.)
ESI analysts working on Croatia: Kristof Bender, Snjezana Vukic,
Telling Croatia's story
In coming weeks ESI will put a lot more on Croatia on our website.
This is part of our Future of Enlargement Project run by ESI deputy
chairman Kristof Bender and supported by ERSTE Foundation in Vienna.
We are preparing, led in Zagreb by ESI analyst Snjezana Vukic, a new
documentary to be broadcast later this year within the award-winning
Return to Europe series in co-operation with the Austrian
Broadcasting Association ORF and Geyerhalter Productions.
Together with the Bosnian think tank Populari, ESI analysts,
including senior analyst Besa Shahini, are analysing how the new
negotiating framework for accession has worked to transform the
Croatian administration in selected areas, with case studies of
reforms in the vital environment and food safety sectors; exploring
what it would take for other countries, including Bosnia, to follow
suit (for more on this project go here).
There are many more lessons both the EU and the region can learn
from Croatia's trajectory since 1999. The most important is
reassuring in times like these: EU soft power and conditionality,
linked to a credible accession process, remains a powerful motor of
change even today.
ESI – Populari Project on lessons from Croatia's reforms for
Zoran Milanovic, Croatia's new Prime Minister (new ESI Interview)
Vesna Pusic, Croatia's new Foreign Minister (new ESI portrait and
Stipe Mesic, former Croatian President (new ESI portrait)
Ivica Racan, former Croatian Prime Minister (new ESI portrait)
ESI Croatia page
The Future of EU Enlargement webpage
As always, we are looking forward to your feedback. However,
please do not reply directly to this message but send your comments
European Stability Initiative (ESI)
Tel: +49 30 53214455
Fax: +49 30 53214457
© European Stability Initiative (ESI)
World Security Network reporting from Bonn in
Germany, January 24, 2012
Dear Cavkic Salih,
GCC Foreign Ministers.
based on traditional legitimacy continues to play a
stabilizing role in the transformation of societies and
their political systems. Traditional hereditary rule seems
to be able to maintain power with more respect, possibly
even with acquired legitimacy, and with lesser need for the
exercise of violence against its own citizens."
Revolutions are not processes of social engineering. They unfold as
an intrinsically unpredictable flow of events. Structurally,
revolutions will go through phases, often through contradictory
periods. Hardly any revolution will evolve without turbulences and
phases of consolidation. And: Revolutions do not happen without
moments of stagnation, surprising advancement and unexpected
The beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 has not been of a different
nature. It started as a fundamental surprise to most, took different
turns in different countries and was far from being over by the end
of 2011. Transatlantic partners are fully aware of the stark
differences among Arab countries. They realize the genuine nature of
each nation's struggle for democracy. Yet, they are inclined to take
the Western experience with democracy as key bench mark for judging
current progress in the Arab world. The constitutional promise of
the US or the success of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and
Central Europe in 1989/90 is inspiring, yet also calls for caution
in judging and projecting the Arab Spring. Preconditions have to be
taken into account. Beside, the history of Europe's 19th and 20th
century also suggest room for failure in the process of moving
toward rule of law and participatory democracy. Some cynics have
already suggested that the Arab Spring could be followed by an Arab
Autumn or even Winter. Even if one discards such previsions as
inappropriate self-fulfilling prophecy, certain European experiences
should probably not be forgotten:
In the 1830s, Germany experienced its own Spring toward
pluralism and democracy, then called “Vormärz”. That German
spring movement ("Sturm und Drang") was essentially a cultural
uprising without the follow-up of transformational political
In 1848, across Europe revolutionary upheavals promoted the hope
for an early parliamentary constitutionalism across the
continent. In most places, this hope was soon to be replaced by
variants of a restrictive consolidation of the ancient regimes.
In 1989, the experience of Romania deviated bly from most
of the peaceful revolutions across Europe. Ousting and even
killing the former dictator was a camouflage for the old regime
to prevail for almost another decade. While the rest of Central
and South Eastern Europe struggled with regime change and
renewal, Romania prolonged regime atrophy and resistance to
No matter what direction the Arab Spring may take in the months and
years ahead, two trends are startling for now:
1. The Arab Spring has initiated a wide range of different reactions
and trends in each of the Arab countries. The assumption of a
homogenous Arab world has become a myth. Likewise, the assumption of
permanently stagnant and immobile Arab societies has become a myth.
The quest for dignity, voice and inclusion under rule of law and a
true structure of social pluralism has been the signature of
peaceful protest all over the Arab world. The reactions of incumbent
regimes have demonstrated a variety of strategies, but also
different levels of strength, legitimacy and criminal energy.
2. Most surprising has been the relative resilience of the Arab
monarchies to the Arab Spring: Morocco and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and
Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain have
been reasonably unaffected and stable (in spite of the temporary
clashes in Bahrain and their oppression with the help of
Saudi-Arabia’s army).While the quest for dignity, voice and
inclusion has posed a challenge to all regimes in the Arab world,
Arab monarchies emerged relatively undisturbed from the first wave
of popular unrest and protest. This contrasts with the protest
against personal rule in most Arab republics: The flight of a
corrupt President whose security apparatus was no longer predictable
(Tunisia), the arrest of a deposed President who seemed to be in
fullest command of its security apparatus, but could not maintain
support of his army (Egypt), the semi-deposition of a ruler who was
torn between security factions and split traditional loyalties
(Yemen), the criminal attack on its own people by the security
forces loyal to a beleaguered President (Syria), the oppression of
all potential unrest by an old regime still in its last sight of
absolute power (Algeria), and the launching of a war by a
delegitimized ruler against his own people (Libya) were variations
of a complex theme across Arab republics. Lebanon has been a special
case for years, with its own transformational revolution (“Cedar
Revolution”) going on since 2005. Iraq and Sudan have also been of a
unique character due to their specific domestic and geopolitical
How can one explain the almost paradoxical phenomenon that
hereditary monarchies - at least for the time being - seem to be
less affected by the protest against personal rule and patrimonial
authoritarianism that has resonated across the Arab world? One
initial observation is undeniable: Saudi-Arabia is particularly
interested in supporting Arab monarchies and it is doing so with an
enormous amount of money. In fact, Saudi Arabia may even be
interested in preventing too far-reaching democratization in Arab
republics. But the vested interests of the Saudi family alone do not
explain why Arab monarchies tend to be more resilient to the current
wave of protest to be heard all over the Arab world. One has to go
beyond the obvious and look for structural explanations. Most
evident - and well beyond the Arab world - is the fact that power
based on traditional legitimacy continues to play a stabilizing role
in the transformation of societies and their political systems.
Usually, republican authoritarian personal rule built on a political
ideology (i.e. independence, socialism, nationalism, development)
can only be maintained through a security apparatus and the pressure
it can exert on a rising popular demand for change. In contrast,
traditional hereditary rule seems to be able to maintain power with
more respect, possibly even with acquired legitimacy, and with
lesser need for the exercise of violence against its own citizens.
The most interesting question stemming from this observation is as
follows: do we know what it may take for monarchies to be successful
over time? It is not enough to simply recall the religious rooting
of Arab monarchical legitimacy as it is especially the case in
Saudi-Arabia and in Morocco. No matter their religious or similar
moral-based authority: The historic record of monarchies confronted
with the pressure for change is mixed. Reference to traditional
religious sources of legitimacy has not been enough for several
monarchies to survive the winds of change their societies where
confronted with. While going beyond this perspective, several
insights into the nature of hereditary rule that has stood the test
of societal change are pertinent and may serve as a useful mirror to
be kept in mind as the future path of hereditary rule in the Arab
world is unfolding.
Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, Director of the
Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at Bonn
University in Germany and a member of the
International Advisory Board of the World Security
can we learn from the survival of consolidated monarchies:
1. No warfare with or threat of violence toward any
neighbor. 2. Turn from a rule of fear into a symbol of
respect and national unity. 3. Separate authority from
power. 4. Disassociate personal wealth from the wealth of
The historic record of hereditary rule when confronted with the
challenges of social, political or economic transformation or even
revolution has not been all too impressive. From the 17th century
(Great Britain) to the 19th century (France, Spain, Portugal,
Brazil, Mexico) and to 20th century (Germany, Russia,
Austria-Hungary, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, China, Greece, Cambodia,
Persia, Nepal, Egypt, Libya, Iraq) more monarchies were toppled than
rebuild whenever their societies were fundamentally transformed. The
current European hereditary monarchies (United Kingdom, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg, Monaco,
Liechtenstein) as well as non-European monarchies (Japan, Malaysia,
Thailand, Brunei, Bhutan, Cambodia, Tonga, Lesotho, Swaziland plus
the Arab monarchies) are rather the exception to the rule – the
global trend seems to favor republican political order as the answer
to socio-economic and political modernization. However, restorations
in Great Britain (17th century) and in Spain (20th century) as well
as the transformation of Imperial rule in Japan after 1945 indicate
the potential for the revival of hereditary rule in times of great
upheaval. The panorama of an ongoing survival of almost two dozen
monarchies and systems of hereditary rules should not forget the
more than two thousand year old electoral monarchy of the Catholic
Church. After all, the Pope is also head of state of the Vatican.
What are the main lessons to be drawn from the survival or revival
of hereditary rule elsewhere that could be of inspirational insight
for the future of contemporary Arab hereditary rulers?
1. No warfare with or threat of violence toward any neighbor.
Consolidated monarchies across the world have recognized the
legitimacy of borders and the sovereign rights of their neighbors.
This, in turn, has helped consolidated monarchies to stay out of
international conflicts over territory or power.
For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply that for the
sake of their own interest they would be well advised to search for
peace with Israel; to recognize Israel and to facilitate a two-state
solution which would allow Israel to live in security and an
independent Palestinian State to live in decency without any border
dispute between either of the two states and between them and the
2. Turn from a rule of fear into a symbol of respect and national
unity. Consolidated monarchies have been able to disconnect the
court from the national security apparatus and to project themselves
as benevolent symbol of national unity, sometimes coupled with a
certain religious authority.
For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply to transfer
security forces and the military to full parliamentary control; to
initiate lustration processes aimed at bringing to justice past
crimes of the security apparatus without deconstructing the security
apparatus as such; to introduce strict rule of law also over all
security forces and military authorities without sidelining them
from the future processes of society and politics.
3. Separate authority from power. Consolidated monarchies have
decoupled their traditional authority from the daily business of
politics and the structure of national power. They have accepted an
independent government and parliamentary rule as the main source of
national political power. Consolidated monarchies have surrendered
their power to constitutional rule and thus maintained their
symbolic and traditional authority.
For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply to empower
parliamentary governance through a prime ministerial
system with full accountability to the respective parliamentary
majority; to terminate the appointment of prime ministers or members
of parliaments, including the Upper House; to initiate a process of
rewriting the national constitution aimed at properly organizing a
new national consensus framed by a constitution-based parliamentary
4. Disassociate personal wealth from the wealth of the country. In
consolidated monarchies, the personal budget of the monarch and the
court has been disconnected from the sources of wealth of the
country. The budget of today's monarchs may still be less
accountable than other elements of public spending, but the
allocation of the court's budget in consolidated monarchies is no
longer based on the ruler's arbitrary access to public goods.
For Arab monarchies, this global experience would imply to separate
state funds from the funds available for the monarch and his
entourage; to install parliamentary control over the allocation of
resources for the hereditary sovereign and a solid system of
accountability for auditing these resources.
Protesters in Bahrain in 2011.
hereditary rulers would be well advised to address key
structural challenges such as promoting a pluralistic civil
society, b legal sector reforms and private investment
that are vital for a peaceful and sustainable transformation
in their respective society."
The path to constitutional and parliamentary monarchy among those
countries that have been able to successfully transform from
personal rule to parliamentary monarchy has always been long and
often arduous. In most cases, it went through similar stages, worth
being recalled as the Arab Spring unfolds.
1. Originally, personal rule was based on control of territory and
people. Gradually, intermediary elites were installed by the ruler
or emerged against the initial will of the ruler. In a long process,
they advanced the notion of legal rule over personal rule (i.e.
Magna Carta). Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to
respond to the quest for freedom and justice from within their
citizenry with a sustained support of independent legal structures.
2. The growing diversification of economic activities - especially
the emergence of capital-based production and division of labor -
generated functional elites (bankers, owners of trading houses and
production) with growing demand for political inclusion and
participation. Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to
support the establishment of independent representation of
functional elites (including business associations and trade unions)
recognized as a genuine sphere of open and legitimate political
discourse with the objective to fully participate in the public
3. The claims of a new bourgeoisie for political inclusion led to an
advanced rule of law and opened the way for democratic participation
which in turn stabilized the socio-political system (middle class).
Arab hereditary monarchs would be well advised to do their utmost to
help their societies moving beyond the prevailing oligarchic
structures, often of a rent-seeking mindset. It is here that the
experience of Turkey's economic development may be a source of
inspiration for the transformation necessary in the Arab world,
beyond the Arab monarchies.
4. Time and again, parliamentary rule came under pressure by the
aspiration of personal rule in the name of contingent social,
cultural and intellectual ideas and ideologies. However, no
republican dictator was ever able to exercise the “natural” features
of traditional rule over such a long time that he could translate
his rule into legitimate hereditary succession. Today, North Korea’s
ruling family and the ruling family of Assad in Syria – and in a
limited way the regimes of Kabila in Congo and of Ali Bongo in Gabon
– are the exception to this rule. Yet, these contemporary hereditary
dictatorships have been unable to generate legitimacy for their
specific version of authoritarian or pseudo-democratic hereditary
succession. A democratic exception to this phenomenon is provided by
the current situation in Singapore: the first prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew’s son is the countries respected and legitimate third Prime
Minister, Lee Hysien Loong. Arab hereditary monarchs would be well
advised to disconnect any family member from public offices that
ought to be mandated by the authorized government which, in turn,
should be held accountable by the respective parliament.
5. Most personal and patrimonial rulers in post-colonial societies
did resort to similar mechanisms of maintaining their position:
patronage, clientelism, theft, corruption, crime and violence
usually were the most prominent features. As republican dictators
are lacking the features of traditional authority, they try to
resort to charismatic rule, violence and coercion, none of which can
generate the necessary features required for transition toward
legitimate hereditary succession. Arab hereditary monarchs would be
well advised to match political openness and transparency with
personal modesty and decency in spending behavior.
For now, the best source of authority of contemporary
monarchies in the Arab world (and elsewhere) is the traditional
legitimacy attributed to their rule. Besides a reflection on the
insights drawn from other consolidated monarchies in today's world,
the current Arab hereditary rulers would be well advised to address
key structural challenges that are vital for a peaceful and
sustainable transformation in their respective society:
1. Consolidate open spaces in which a pluralistic civil society can
thrive. Relate these open spaces to the political arena and include
open political spaces into the national dialogue on constitutional
2. Rehabilitate the authority of the public sphere by promoting
multi-party systems. Election thresholds of 3 to 5 percent ought to
guarantee that these multi-party systems help consolidating the new
3. Promote b legal sector reforms including all levels of the
judiciary and the penitentiary system. Initiate public education
programs that raise the awareness of the primacy of rule of law over
any system of personal patronage, coercion or arbitrariness.
4. Most importantly: Promote private investment – both domestic and
international - with the prime aim of providing sustainable
employment opportunities for the young generation. In the end, only
a stable middle class based on qualified and appropriate means of
education and vocational training can guarantee long-term stability
in any Arab society.
Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU, and Amr
Moussa, former Secretary-General of the League of Arab
"Transatlantic partners will have to re-define their
strategies toward the Arab world. They ought to devise a
joint strategy to engage Arab monarchies in multifold
processes of transformation aimed at advancing the reality
of consolidated, legitimate and modernized monarchies that
eventually accept the frame of parliamentary
The Arab Spring has opened a new chapter in the political history of
the Arab world. The outcome is far from predictable. It may vary
from country to country and it may drag on with different speed and
intensity for years, if not for decades. But a beginning has been
made thanks to the courage of non-violent people, who want to
revitalize their societies on the basis of dignity, freedom and
justice. In a geopolitical context, the historic opportunity which
the Arab Spring represents will, at least, lead to two fundamental
1. The traditional prejudice according to which Africa is divided
between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa will fall. The issue of
overcoming personal rule and introducing constitutional change aimed
at enabling rule of law-based pluralistic democracy is as pertinent
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa as it is in the Arab World. In both
regions the issue reflects the deficits of post-colonial politics.
Hence, the uprising of the Arab Spring has been watched with great
intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa, with enthusiasm among young people
and with worry among some of the petrified post-colonial elites. The
Arab Spring will repeat itself in several sub-Saharan societies.
There, it will most likely bring about the same mixed picture of
success, stagnation and failure as we see in the Arab world. Thus,
it will support the trend (and the need) for a differentiated
perception of Africa. Instead of continuously and erroneously
imagining Africa as one, the long-term constitutional effect of the
Arab Spring will help to distinguish between an emerging Africa of
successful political transformation beyond the post-colonial era,
and a stagnating Africa that remains trapped in post-colonial
structures of personal rule and patrimonialism.
2. Transatlantic partners will have to re-define their strategies
toward the Arab world. Neither policies of fear and stereotypes
based on distorted notions of identity nor attitudes of benevolent
paternalism will help to redefine American and European relations
with the Arab societies and their emerging new political structures.
Transatlantic partners need to engage the Arab world – and
eventually Africa, too – into a comprehensive agenda of
As for the transatlantic partners, it will be necessary to move
beyond the traditional security paradigm. For a long time, Arab
monarchies were considered Western security partners based on
geopolitical considerations with little consideration for domestic
issues. In the future, the Arab monarchies can be stable security
partners of the West if their legitimate domestic stability provides
the ground for predictable international behavior. The necessary
transformation processes will accompany Arab hereditary rulers for
many years to come. Transatlantic partners ought to engage Arab
monarchies in multifold processes of transformation aimed at
advancing the reality of consolidated, legitimate and modernized
monarchies that eventually accept the frame of parliamentary
constitutionalism. The notion of parliamentary monarchy may be new
to Arab hereditary systems. It is, however, not impossible to
achieve such a stage as other monarchies around the world have
proven. In fact, it may well be the only realistic option for Arab
monarchies to prevail over time.
Currently, the transatlantic partners pursue independent strategies
of cooperation with the Arab world. In spite of a b normative
overlap, their strategies also represent different interests and
genuine approaches. The enormous challenge of the current opening of
the Arab political space should be seen as a golden opportunity for
both the United States and the European Union to define a joint
strategy of their future engagement with the Arab world. Its
formative ideas should be transformation and legitimacy, its long
term objectives stability and partnership, and its driving
instruments geared at promoting civil society and the private
Some monarchies went through stages of transformation that stretched
over centuries. The hereditary rulers in the Arab world may not have
so much time. What is truly new of the events of 2011 is the spirit
of the Arab Spring: self-empowerment of Arab societies, bringing
back dignity and hope to frustrated and marginalized societies,
enabling millions of citizens to act as proud, self-confident and
open partners of their neighbors. This might only be the first step
in a long, complex and often vexed journey. Currently, the main
focus among transatlantic partners is on the future of Arab
republics which are torn between the most extreme possible
scenarios. Some may think that Arab monarchies will be the last to
reform and hence can be neglected right now. There are good reasons
to argue for the opposite. Unreformed Arab monarchies could
undermine any progress currently made in Arab republics. But
reformed, transformed and consolidated Arab monarchies could become
reliable agents for change and legitimacy in a renewed Arab world.
Prof. Dr. Ludger Kuehnhardt
Director of the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at the
University of Bonn in Germany
Member of the
WSN International Advisory Board
Former EU Parliament President Hans-Gert Poettering
MEP on Democracy in the Arab World
Hans-Gert Poettering, Former EU Parliament
President, on democracy in the Arab world.
Former EU Parliament President Hans-Gert
Poettering MEP on progress in Libya and the Israel/Palestine
Hans-Gert Poettering, Former EU Parliament
President, on progress in Libya and the Israel/Palestine conflict.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - BOSNA i HERCEGOVINA
A Public Announcement
about the demand to oppose the totalitarian government and its
politics versus the man
Mr. Mirnes Ajanovic
Mr. Sakib Balic
The president of the BOSS, Mr. Mirnes Ajanovic, is
warning that he tragic death of a veteran Mr. Sakib Balic,
which is the result of self-immolation for hopelessness caused by
the inhuman politics of the ruling parties has to be a warning to
everyone not to allow further continuation of the totalitarian
government and its politics versus the man.
The revolution is the only way to confront the political dictators,
who recklessly make decisions about people’s destinies in order to
achieve their own profit-making interests.
The president of the BOSS, Mr. Mirnes Ajanovic, is
appealing, saying that it is the final time that all the union,
veteran’s, non-governmental, senior citizens’ and opposition
political organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with support from
the independent media, unite in the resistance to the ruling
Mr. Muamer Dedic, the BOSS Press
January 12th, 2012
Deutsche Bundesamt warnt vor Schadprogramm
Computernutzer sollen dringend ihre Rechner checken
von Alfred Krüger
Zehntausende deutsche Rechner sind mit dem Schadprogramm "DNS-Changer" infiziert.
Der Schädling hat die Netzwerkeinstellungen manipuliert. Das Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik rät zum Selbsttest auf einer offiziellen
Video Datenklau am Hotspot
Die "Operation Ghost Click" dauerte zwei Jahre.
Anfang November 2011 schlug das FBI in Estland zu. Die estnische Polizei
verhaftete sechs Männer und eine Frau im Alter von 26 bis 31 Jahren. Ihnen wurde
vorgeworfen, ein Botnetz betrieben und weltweit mehr als vier Millionen Rechner
mit dem Schadprogramm "DNS-Changer" infiziert zu haben - darunter auch
mindestens 33.000 deutsche Rechner.
BSI empfiehlt Schnelltest
Die internationalen Ermittlungen wurde am 7.
November offiziell beendet. Doch das kriminelle Treiben der siebenköpfigen
Cybergang wirkt noch heute nach. Denn auf vielen Rechnern ist der "DNS-Changer"
noch aktiv. Deren Besitzer merken davon nichts. Das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI) und das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) empfehlen deshalb
allen Usern, ihre Rechner umgehend zu überprüfen.
Neue Schadsoftware im Internet
BKA und BSI haben schnell reagiert und zusammen mit der Deutschen Telekom die Webseite
Link - Öffnet in neuem Fenster) ins Netz gestellt. Hier kann jeder
Internetnutzer kostenlos und sekundenschnell testen, ob sein Rechner noch immer
mit dem gefährlichen Schädling infiziert ist. Einfaches Ansurfen der Webseite
reicht aus. Sofort wird angezeigt, ob der PC den "DNS-Changer" beherbergt.
Der Schädling hat es in sich. Er konfiguriert befallene Rechner so um, dass bei
allen Surftouren statt der regulären DNS-Server etwa der Deutschen Telekom ein
manipulierter DNS-Server mit Standort in Rumänien aufgerufen wird. Betroffen
sind nicht nur Windows-PCs, sondern laut BSI auch Rechner der Marke Apple
DNS-Server stellen über das Internet die Verbindung zwischen zwei Rechnern her.
Sie arbeiten wie Vermittlungsstellen und liefern zu jeder Webadresse, die man im Browser eingibt, die IP-Adresse des Servers, auf dem die fragliche Webseite
gespeichert ist. Anschließend verbinden sie automatisch weiter. Das alles geht
so schnell, dass der Nutzer von diesen Vorgängen nichts bemerkt
14 Millionen Euro ergaunert
Die Cyberkriminellen aus Estland arbeiteten mit einem einfachen, aber äußerst
wirksamen Trick. Sie hatten die "Webadressbücher" in ihrem DNS-Server so
manipuliert, dass sie jeden Surfer auf Webseiten ihrer Wahl lenken konnten.
Statt der eigentlich gewünschten Webseite wurden die infizierten Rechner auf
völlig andere Seiten umgeleitet.
Die Betrüger hatten sich als Werbevermittler getarnt und kassierten für jeden
Surfer, den sie auf bestimmte Webportale lenkten, eine Provision. Solche
Provisionen sind in der Online-Werbebranche durchaus an der Tagesordnung, nicht jedoch die Methode, mit der die Provisionen ergaunert wurden. Innerhalb von zwei
Jahren erwirtschafteten die estnischen Betrüger mit dieser und weiteren
Betrugsmaschen mehr als 14 Millionen Euro.
Server werden abgeschaltet
Nach der Festnahme der Betrüger wurden die manipulierten Server durch korrekt
arbeitende DNS-Server ersetzt. Hätte man die rumänischen Server sofort
abgeschaltet, wäre "bei den betroffenen Rechnern (...) eine Internetnutzung"
nicht mehr möglich gewesen, sagt das BKA. Vier Millionen Nutzer - darunter auch
staatliche Stellen und sogar die US-Weltraumbehörde NASA - hätten dann keinen
Zugang mehr zum Internet gehabt.
Am 8. März 2012 sollen die fraglichen DNS-Server nun endgültig abgeschaltet
werden. Betroffene Nutzer, auf deren Rechnern sich immer noch der "DNS-Changer"
befindet, können dann keine Webseiten mehr aufrufen. "Daher sollten
Internetnutzer die Überprüfung und gegebenenfalls Reinigung ihres Rechners
möglichst bald durchführen", rät das BKA.
Hilfe auf botfrei.de
Nutzer, die mit Hilfe des Tests auf der Webseite
Link - Öffnet in neuem Fenster) erfahren, dass ihr Rechner infiziert
ist, erhalten dort weiterführende Informationen. "Zur Reinigung des Rechners
können die Betroffenen beispielsweise die unter
Link - Öffnet in neuem Fenster) bereit gestellten Programme wie den 'DE-Cleaner'
nutzen", raten BSI und BKA
World Security Network reporting from London in the United Kingdom, January 08,
Field Marshal The Rt. Hon. The Lord Inge:
a real British army officer and a gentleman with a British sense of
humour, a world-view and inner power and musicality knows the world well
from many visits abroad, and is a fresh thinker. He is the last officer
to be promoted to the historic title of Field Marshal, as the government
and Her Majesty no longer honour generals with this rank.
When you want to meet a real British army officer and a gentleman with a
British sense of humour, a world-view and inner power and musicality, the best
option is a lunch in the House of Lords with Field Marshal The Rt. Hon. The Lord
I admire him not because of his impressive titles and his excellent career, but
because he can think around the corner like the Chinese, knows the world well
from many visits abroad, and is a fresh thinker.
He is the last officer to be promoted to the historic title of Field Marshal, as
the government and Her Majesty no longer honour generals with this rank.
Peter Inge was the Chief of the General Staff, the head of the British Army,
between 1992 and 1994, and then served as Chief of Defence Staff before his
retirement in 1997. In 1989 he became the Commander of NATO’s Northern Army
Group and Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine in Germany.
After stepping down as Chief of the Defence Staff, he was created a life peer as
Baron Inge, of Richmond in the County of North Yorkshire. In 2002 he was
appointed as one of the 24 Knights of the Garter.
As a member of the International Advisory Board of the World Security Network
Foundation he has a special interest in the support of the young elite in
defence and foreign affairs and the situation in MENA and Afghanistan/Pakistan.
He gave an interview for WSN TV with his views on Libya and the development in
MENA and the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann
President and Founder
World Security Network Foundation
Fógra tábhachtach Nuacht