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Important News, Belangrijke nieuws, Nouvelles importantes, Wichtige News, Fontos hírek, Importanti novitŕ, Pomembne novice, Importante Notícias, Viktiga nyheter



Ing. Salih CAVKIC
Editor
by ORBUS.ONE
info@orbus.one
www.orbus.one


 
No more Paris nor Brussels!
Stop terrorism!
We want to live in peace with all our neighbors.
  regardless of their religion, color and origin.
Therefore, we condemn any kind of terrorism!

*****
Ne više Pariz ni Brisel!
Stop terorizam!
Mi želimo živjeti u miru sa svim našim komšijama,
bez obzira koje su vjere, boje kože i porijekla.
Zato mi osuđujemo svaku vrstu terorizma!


Belang van Limburg
De Morgen
De Standard
Het Laatste Nieuws
La Libre Belgique
Nieuwsblaad

VRT
VRT Nieuws

N-TV.DE
Deutsche Welle
West-D. Zeitung




The man of the year 2009
Guy Verhofstadt
Mr. Guy Verhofstadt

The man of the year
L'homme de l'ane
De man van het jaar
2009





Maasmechelen Village
Belgium



The man of the year 2012


Mr. Barak Hossein Obama

The man of the year
L'homme de l'an
De man van het jaar
2012


Guarantee
peace in the world
 





Prof. dr. Murray Hunter
University Malaysia Perlis




Eva MAURINA
20 Years to Trade Economic Independence for Political Sovereignty - Eva MAURINA



IN MEMORIAM

Aleš Debeljak +
In Defense of Cross-Fertilization: Europe and Its Identity Contradictions - Aleš Debeljak

ALEŠ DEBELJAK - ABECEDA DJETINJSTVA

ALEŠ DEBEJAK - INTERVJU; PROSVJEDI, POEZIJA, DRŽAVA




Rattana Lao
Rattana Lao holds a doctorate in Comparative and International Education from Teachers College, Columbia University and is currently teaching in Bangkok.




Bakhtyar Aljaf
Director of Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia




Rakesh Krishnan Simha
Géométrie variable of a love triangle – India, Russia and the US





Amna Whiston
Amna Whiston is a London-based writer specialising in moral philosophy. As a PhD candidate at Reading University, UK, her main research interests are in ethics, rationality, and moral psychology.





Eirini Patsea 
Eirini Patsea is a Guest Editor in Modern Diplomacy, and specialist in Cultural Diplomacy and Faith-based Mediation
.




Belmir Selimovic
Can we trust the government to do the right thing, are they really care about essential things such as environmental conditions and education in our life?




IN MEMORIAM


Dubravko Lovrenović + Univ. prof. Dubravko Lovrenović is one of the leading European Medievalist specialized in the Balkans, pre-modern and modern political history.




Manal Saadi
Postgraduate researcher in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Geneva-based UMEF University




doc.dr.Jasna Cosabic
professor of IT law and EU law at Banja Luka College,
Bosnia and Herzegovina




Aleksandra Krstic
Studied in Belgrade (Political Science) and in Moscow (Plekhanov’s IBS). Currently, a post-doctoral researcher at the Kent University in Brussels (Intl. Relations). Specialist for the MENA-Balkans frozen and controlled conflicts.

Contact: alex-alex@gmail.com






Dr. Swaleha Sindhi is Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Administration, the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, India. Decorated educational practitioner Dr. Sindhi is a frequent columnist on related topics, too. She is the Vice President of Indian Ocean Comparative Education Society (IOCES). Contact: swalehasindhi@gmail.com




Barçın Yinanç
 It is an Ankara-based journalist and notable author. She is engaged with the leading Turkish dailies and weeklies for nearly three decades as a columnist, intervieweer and editor. Her words are prolifically published and quoted in Turkish, French an English.




 By İLNUR ÇEVIK
Modified from the original: They killed 1 Saddam and created 1,000 others (Daily Sabah)




Aine O’Mahony
Aine O'Mahony has a bachelor in Law and Political Science at the Catholic Institute of Paris and is currently a master's student of Leiden University in the International Studies programme.Contact: aine-claire.nini@hotmail.fr




Elodie Pichon

  Elodie Pichon has a  bachelor in Law and Political Science at the Catholic Institute of Paris and is currently doing a MA in Geopolitics, territory and Security at King's College London. Contact : elodie.pichon@gmail.com




Qi Lin

Qi Lin, a MA candidate of the George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research focus is on cross-Pacific security and Asian studies, particularly on the Sino-U.S. relations and on the foreign policy and politics of these two.




ALESSANDRO CIPRI
Born in Chile and raised in Rome, Alessandro Cipri has just finished his postgraduate studies at the department of War Studies of King's College London, graduating with distinction from the Master's Degree in "Intelligence and International Security". Having served in the Italian Army's "Alpini" mountain troops, he has a keen interest in national security, military strategy, insurgency theory, and terrorism studies. His Master's dissertation was on the impact of drug trafficking on the evolution of the Colombian FARC.




Ms. Lingbo ZHAO
is a candidate of the Hong Kong Baptist University, Department of Government and International Studies. Her research interest includes Sino-world, Asia and cross-Pacific.

Contact: harryzhaolin@gmail.com

 


Hannes Grassegger
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin specialized journal.

 

Mikael Krogerus

Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin specialized journal.

 


Michal Kosinski

Scientific analysis

 


Elodie Pichon,
Ms. Elodie Pichon, Research Fellow of the IFIMES Institute, DeSSA Department. This native Parisian is a Master in Geopolitics, Territory and Security from the King’s College, London, UK.





Djoeke Altena



Muhamed Sacirbey
Muhamed Sacirbey

Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey currently lectures on Digital-Diplomacy. "Mo" has benefited from a diverse career in investment banking & diplomacy, but his passion has been the new avenues of communication. He was Bosnia & Herzegovina's first Ambassador to the United Nations, Agent to the International Court of Justice, Foreign Minister & Signatory of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. He also played American football opting for a scholarship to Tulane University in New Orleans after being admitted to Harvard, oh well!!




Amanda Janoo

Amanda Janoo is an Alternative Economic Policy Adviser to governments and development organizations. Graduate from Cambridge University with an MPhil in Development Studies, Amanda worked at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) supporting government's with evidence-based industrial policy design for inclusive and sustainable growth. Her research focus is on the relationship between international trade and employment generation. She has worked throughout Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa promoting greater economic self-determination and empowerment.




Michael dr. Logies,

Germany




Endy Bayuni

The writer, editor-in-chief of The Jakarta Post, took part in the Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, organized by the Institute for Peace and Democracy and the Press Council, on Dec.5-6.




Élie Bellevrat
Élie Bellevrat is the WEO Energy Analysts




 Kira West
 Kira West is the WEO Energy Analysts




Victor Davis Hanson NRO contributor Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author, most recently, of The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won.




Alexander Savelyev - Chief Research Fellow at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow, Russia). In 1989-1991 was a member of Soviet negotiating team at START-1 negotiations (Defense and Space Talks).




Ingrid Stephanie Noriega
Ingrid Stephanie Noriega is junior specialist in International Relations, Latina of an immense passion for human rights, democratic accountability, and conflict resolution studies as it relates to international development for the Latin America and Middle East – regions of her professional focus.









INDEX 2017

INDEX 2016





English
Important News


Dutch - Nederlands
Belangrijke nieuws


French - Français
Nouvelles importantes


German - Deutsch
Wichtige News


Bosnian-Bosanski
Važne vijesti





 


2018

 

 

Keeping the Nuclear Arms Control alive 

Alexander Savelyev[*]

 

Back to the heydays of the global Cold War, what eventually kept the US and the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons was the dangerous and costly struggle called: ‘mutual destruction assurance’. Already by the late 1950s, both sides achieved parity in the number and type of nuclear warheads as well as in the number and precision of their delivery systems. Both sides produced enough warheads, delivery systems’ secret depots and launching sites to amply survive the first impact and to maintain a strong second-strike capability. Once comprehending that neither the preventive nor preemptive nuclear strike would bring a decisive victory (put a premium on striking first to gain the initial advantage and set the course of the war, by element of surprise and quick assertion), but would actually trigger the final global nuclear holocaust and ensure total mutual destruction, the Americans and the Soviets have achieved a fear–equilibrium through the hazardous deterrence. Thus, it was not an intended armament rush (for parity), but the non-intended Mutual Assurance Destruction – MAD – with its tranquilizing effect of nuclear weaponry, if possessed in sufficient quantities and impenetrable configurations – that brought a bizarre sort of pacifying stability between two confronting superpowers” – prof. Anis H Bajrektarevic stated in his well-read policy paper on Security structures of Asia and Europe, concluding that: “MAD prevented nuclear war, but did not disarm the superpowers.”

What is the state of nuclear disarmament today? Following lines are giving a comprehensive overview of the efforts in the post-Cold period.

 

*    *    *    *    *

 

For almost eight years we have been witnessing a decline (or even absence) of Russian and U.S. efforts in the sphere of nuclear arms control, which can be seen at both the official and expert levels. The last achievement in this field was the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New Start Treaty) which was signed by Russia and the United States in 2010 and entered into force in February 2011. Since then, issues pertaining to further steps in nuclear disarmament have disappeared from the agenda of Russian-American relations.

In the past, such pauses were filled with active consultations and were used to rethink one’s own policy in this area and comprehensively assess the other party’s position. Preparatory work continued even in the period between the fall of 1983 (when the Soviet Union withdrew from all nuclear arms negotiations with the United States) and the spring of 1985 (when the negotiations were resumed), while informal contacts between the parties (primarily through scientific communities) became much stronger.

Over a period of fifty years, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia achieved significant progress in curbing the nuclear arms race and gradually and steadily lowering the level of nuclear confrontation between the two major nuclear powers. In the Soviet Union/Russia, the greatest achievements in nuclear arms control were made during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev. Vladimir Putin played an important role in the ratification of the START II Treaty (2000) during his first term as president, as he convinced legislators of its effectiveness and usefulness for Russia’s security interests, and in the conclusion of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002). Dmitry Medvedev earned a place for himself in the history of nuclear disarmament by signing the aforementioned 2010 Treaty. It was only during the brief rule of Yuri Andropov (from November 1982 to February 1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (from February 1984 to March 1985) that there was no tangible progress in nuclear arms control.

In the United States, all the eight presidents that preceded Donald Trump—from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama—had achievements in this field. It is still an open question whether Trump will want to break with this tradition. In any case, there are several arguments both in favor of and against such a possibility. It should be emphasized that not everything depends on the desire or unwillingness of the U.S. administration to conclude new agreements in this area. Russia’s position has an equal role to play, and this position does not inspire much optimism at the present time.

Politicians and experts name many reasons for the breach of Russia-U.S. relations in the field of nuclear arms control. One of them is believed to be the deterioration of Russia-West relations over the Ukraine crisis. But facts show that the problem arose much earlier. In March 2013 (that is, one year before the events in Ukraine), former chief of the presidential administration of Russia Sergei Ivanov openly said that Russia was not interested in further reductions in armaments and named the reason for that: the completion of the modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and its unwillingness to eliminate new strategic weapons that had only recently entered service.

Another argument, named by President Putin in February 2012, is the need to involve third nuclear powers in the nuclear disarmament process after the 2010 treaty. Further explanations provided by some other officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, claimed that deeper reductions (outside the treaty’s framework) would make the strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the U.S. “comparable” with those of third nuclear powers.

Moscow puts the main blame for the failure to achieve new nuclear arms control agreements with the U.S. on the missile defense problem. This problem arose now and then in Soviet times and came to a head in 1983 when President Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The SDI slowed down START I negotiations and nearly blocked the conclusion of this and other nuclear disarmament agreements. The United States’ withdrawal from the open-ended ABM Treaty in 2002 and its subsequent efforts to create and deploy missile defense in its own territory and territories of its allies, coupled with unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement with Russia on joint missile defense programs, exacerbated the situation still further.

Moscow also explains the lack of progress in strategic nuclear arms reductions by the possession of nuclear weapons by Washington’s NATO allies. Anatoly Antonov, who at that time was Russian deputy defense minister, said this factor “cannot be ignored.” Other factors that Moscow says should be “taken into account” include the “Global Strike” concept, the deployment of strategic precision-guided conventional weapons, plans to deploy weapons in outer space, the presence of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and some other disproportions, many of which are mentioned in Russia’s present National Security Strategy, approved by Putin in late 2015.

Russia’s position on further steps towards nuclear disarmament resembles that of the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. It is based on the principle of “equal security,” which means that all factors determining the balance of power between the opposing sides should be taken into account. This explains why in negotiations with Washington on strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union considered it justified to demand compensation for imbalances in other categories of arms.

Naturally, fifty years ago, the categories of weapons subject to “compensation” were different from those of today. They did not include conventional weapons of any kind. Moscow was concerned about nuclear weapons possessed by the U.S.’s NATO allies, and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. Now Russia has taken a broader approach, focusing more on non-nuclear armaments, which creates additional difficulties in the search for mutual understanding with the United States and which calls into question the possibility of concluding new agreements.

If we recognize that Russia’s concern over the effect of missile defense and precision-guided and other conventional weapons on the strategic balance is of a fundamental nature, a natural question arises: How to accommodate this concern if a political decision is made to continue the nuclear disarmament process? And should Russia agree to deeper reductions in nuclear weapons if its concern is ignored?

Needless to say, no agreement on strategic offensive arms can set unequal ceilings on the number of warheads and their strategic delivery vehicles remaining after reductions. That would be at variance with the very meaning of an international treaty, which should be based on the principle of equality of the parties and which should conform to its subject matter. Nevertheless, there are other ways to accommodate the aforementioned concerns. For example, in the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was very concerned about the SDI program and American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. This is why a package solution was proposed—simultaneous negotiations on three issues: medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, strategic offensive arms, and defense and outer space. Moscow put forward a condition that the three planned agreements should be signed simultaneously. Washington did not object. However, the Soviet Union did not adhere to this position for long. At first, the term ‘nuclear delivery vehicles’ was used to designate only land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, while aviation was excluded from the negotiations. Later, Moscow removed this category of weapons from the initial package, after which, in December 1987, the parties signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which is of unlimited duration.

For a much longer time, almost until all provisions of the START I Treaty were agreed, the Soviet Union insisted on a linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, which was reflected in official statements and the structure of the Soviet delegation to the talks. Moscow sent one delegation to the talks on these two types of weapons. Negotiations on defense and outer space were conducted by a separate group within the delegation. The United States was represented by two separate delegations. One worked on START I, and the other held consultations on defense and outer space. When it became clear that the defense and space negotiations would fail and that the START I Treaty was almost ready, the Soviet Union signed the treaty but made a unilateral statement on the need to observe the ABM Treaty as a condition for implementing START I.

This experience proves that one real way to accommodate concerns is to conclude separate agreements on the most pressing security problems, including missile defense, precision-guided long-range weapons, and space weapons. The authors of 
World 2035. Global Forecast, published by the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in 2017, admit of this possibility but consider it the least likely of the proposed four scenarios for the development of the military-political situation in the world in the period until 2035.

Speaking of concrete ways to accommodate concerns, one should assess, at least approximately, the effect of missile defense, precision-guided weapons and space weapons on the Russian-U.S. strategic balance. First of all, let us note an interesting circumstance. When it comes to the effect of various factors on the strategic balance, Russian officials insisting that this effect should be taken into account somehow fail to mention air defense. If we follow this logic, then any weapons capable of combating strategic offensive weapons should be included in the overall balance of power, especially if they are intended to combat retaliatory systems. These weapons definitely include the aviation component of the strategic triad. Without going into further discussion, let us note that this omission of air defense issues seems to be due to some other considerations than a desire to strengthen strategic stability.

Of the remaining three categories of weapons, which, in the opinion of the Russian leadership, have an effect on the strategic balance, space weapons are the most interesting from the point of view of concluding a possible agreement. The fact is, there are no such weapons yet, as far as we know. Therefore, they have no effect on the strategic balance. It is worth recalling the Soviet Union’s struggle against the SDI program in the second half of the 1980s. Many experts said then that “space strike weapons” would be created in the foreseeable future. The most skeptical participants in discussions said that such systems would appear in 20 to 25 years at the earliest. 30 years have passed since then, but this type of weapons (space-based lasers, railguns and other exotic weapons) has not come into existence so far. There are no serious reasons, either, to suggest that space weapons will be in the strategic arsenal of the United States or other countries within the next two to three decades, even if new technologies make this possible. In this case, the following factors will come into play: cost, combat effectiveness of weapon systems, their vulnerability, and possible reaction from the domestic opposition, individual countries and the international community as a whole. These factors may not only slow down but prevent the militarization of space.

In addition, there are no commonly agreed definitions for such terms as ‘weapons’, which can be the subject of an agreement on space issues. Unfortunately, such an agreement can hardly be based on the draft international Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, submitted by China and Russia to the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 (and its updated version, submitted in 2014). The draft only proposed preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space and made no mention of prohibiting their development or testing in space. Nor did it mention weapons deployed on Earth but capable of destroying outer space objects.

Criticisms of this document can be continued, but the main problem is whether it is possible to reach a verifiable agreement on limiting or banning space weapons, whatever this term might mean, even if all parties show real interest in it. There are more doubts than optimism regarding this possibility. Answering this question requires more than just efforts by diplomats, the military and developers of space weapons. More experts should be involved in these efforts, including scientists from countries that may be parties to future agreements.

Another interesting question concerns long-range precision-guided conventional weapons and their effect on the strategic balance. According to the majority of specialists, this type of weapons includes cruise missiles, non-nuclear ICBMs, and some weapon systems (for example, hypersonic gliders). As a rule, the degree of effect such weapons may have on the strategic balance is not assessed. Nevertheless, it is asserted that they can not only weaken but also undermine strategic stability. This is a doubtful statement.

If we view these systems from the point of view of strengthening the offensive capability, they are absolutely incommensurable with nuclear weapons in terms of power. Precision-guided weapons are absolutely unsuitable for preemptive strikes for many reasons. Speaking of non-nuclear ICBMs, their accuracy should by far exceed that of nuclear ICBMs. Otherwise, they won’t be able to destroy hard targets (such as missile silos or command centers). According to open source data, modern ICBMs have accuracy (circular error probable - CEP) of several dozen meters, at best. Destroying a hard target with a conventional warhead requires this accuracy of not more than several meters, which is impossible to achieve at the present technological level of these systems.

But this is not the main concern. If an aggressor decides to use precision-guided weapons (conventional ICBMs) in a surprise attack to destroy a significant part of the opponent’s nuclear arsenal, it will have to plan a massive attack. Such an attack cannot go unnoticed due to a missile warning system. There is no guarantee that the attacked party will not use nuclear warning systems when it receives information confirming the attack. So, it does not really matter to the victim of such aggression whether the approaching ICBMs carry nuclear or conventional warheads. The response will almost certainly be nuclear, with all the ensuing consequences.

Finally, one more important argument is that if Russia or the United States decides to deploy a great number of non-nuclear ICBMs, they will most likely have to do this at the expense of their own strategic nuclear weapons. If the 2010 treaty remains in effect (until 2021) and if it is extended (until 2026), all ICBMs will be counted under the treaty’s limits for strategic delivery vehicles (700 deployed delivery vehicles for each party). In order for non-nuclear ICBMs not to be counted under the treaty, one needs to create a new strategic delivery vehicle and prove that this weapon system is not covered by this treaty. This will be very hard to do, given the strained Russian-American relations. Unilateral actions will most likely lead to the collapse of this international agreement.

As regards cruise missiles as an element of precision-guided weapons, one important issue should be clarified above all. Under the New START Treaty of 2010, long-range (over 600 km) nuclear cruise missiles are not counted as strategic offensive arms. In other words, in the opinion of Russia and the United States, they are not strategic weapons. Each heavy bomber carrying nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles is counted as one delivery vehicle and one warhead, no matter how many missiles it may carry. Sea-launched cruise missiles are not covered by this treaty at all. It does not even mention the term ‘long-range nuclear cruise missile.’ Simply put, the parties do not think that these nuclear weapons can undermine the strategic balance; therefore, they see no reason to limit them in the START Treaty. In this case, however, it is completely unclear why long-range nuclear cruise missiles do not affect the strategic balance between the parties, as Moscow and Washington stated in the above-mentioned agreement, whereas similar conventional weapons should undermine strategic stability, especially since some studies show that conventional cruise missiles are not capable of destroying highly protected strategic offensive weapons.

It is believed in Russia that the most serious threat to strategic stability comes from missile defense. However, there is much more ambiguity in this issue than evidence confirmed by practice. First of all, many experts and politicians follow a strange logic when talking about missile defense issues, and their logic differs significantly from the normal perception of the security problem. For example, it is claimed that the U.S. missile defense system “threatens” Russia’s strategic potential. But such a threat can be translated into action only after Russia strikes with ballistic missiles. For as long as these missiles are not used, missile defense does not threaten them. Saying that missile defense poses a threat to someone’s nuclear potential is the same as saying that a hard hat worn by a construction worker is a threat to a brick that may fall on his head.

Opponents of missile defense argue that it will be used after the enemy delivers a first strike against its opponent’s strategic forces, thus greatly weakening the latter’s retaliatory strike. It is this retaliatory strike that will have to be intercepted by missile defense. This abstract and senseless reasoning underlies the logic of missile defense opponents who denounce any programs for creating and deploying missile defense. They view such efforts as an attempt to achieve military superiority and create conditions for victory in a nuclear war. In fact, the entire concept of strategic stability is based on the assessment of the consequences of a first strike and the aggressor’s ability to repulse a retaliatory strike.

Debates over the effect of missile defense on strategic stability have been going on for sixty years, so there is no need to cite here all arguments for and against, set forth in numerous publications. Let us only note that these debates were largely held in the U.S. In the Soviet Union and Russia, an overwhelming majority of experts shared the view that the development of missile defense systems undermines strategic stability, increasing the probability of a first strike in crisis situations and spurring a race in strategic arms in all areas. As a rule, the debates focused on the assessment of effectiveness of missile defense systems and time required for the deployment of new weapon systems.

Now let’s see how the United States can repulse Russia’s “retaliatory strike” after its own “large-scale nuclear attack,” if such plans really exist. First of all, let’s take a look at the geography of U.S. missile defense systems. If the main task of the U.S. were to defend against a Russian retaliatory strike, it would deploy its missile defense system primarily along its borders and deep in its heartland. A thin defense of the country would require at least 10 to 12 deployment areas with several dozen interceptor missiles in each. As far as is known, nothing like this is happening. Such a program does not exist, and such proposals have never been submitted. By the end of 2017, 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) are to be deployed in U.S. territory (40 in Alaska and 4 in California). By 2025, the number of GBIs is planned to be increased to 56.

It should be recalled here that the most important provision of the 1972 ABM Treaty (from which the U.S. withdrew in 2002) was the limitation of interceptor missiles capable of shooting down incoming ICBM warheads. Each party was permitted to have up to 200 ABM systems in two ABM deployment areas. The Protocol of 1974 to the Treaty limited the number of ABM systems to 100 at each ABM site. In other words, the U.S. has not yet exceeded the limit set by the ABM Treaty and will not do so in the foreseeable future, which means that strategic stability, as understood by missile defense opponents, is not undermined.

Russia is greatly concerned over the proposed missile defense system for Europe and keeps an eye on programs for deploying similar systems in the Middle East and some Asian countries. But all these systems are not strategic in terms of location and performance. Of course, some modifications of the U.S. Standard interceptor missiles, THAAD and some other systems have a certain potential to combat strategic ballistic missiles. But they are not intended to perform such tasks and can shoot down ICBM warheads only accidentally. It is also important that the above BMD systems have never been tested against strategic missiles (warheads); so they cannot be relied on for intercepting retaliatory strikes with strategic ballistic missiles.

In addition, these systems pose no threat to Russia’s strategic potential due to the geography of their deployment. This will be clear if we move from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional vision of this geography. Simply put, we should be looking not at the flat map of the world, but at the globe. Then many things will look differently. For example, we will see that the shortest way from Russia to America is not via Amsterdam or Paris, but across the North Pole.

To my view, there are no serious military-strategic obstacles to further dialogue between Russia and the United States on more reductions in strategic offensive arms. The effect of precision-guided and space weapons on the strategic balance between the parties is clearly exaggerated. In the foreseeable future, their effect will continue to be minimal, if at all.

U.S. missile defense programs are limited in terms of their impact on Russia’s ability to deliver a crushing retaliatory strike, even if weakened by a U.S. first strategic strike. The latter, too, is a very dubious strategic concept, which, nevertheless, underlies many discussions about ways to strengthen security and so-called strategic stability. No sane leader of a country would rely on an unreliable missile defense system, which has failed many tests and which can be bypassed by changing the direction of attack.

As for political obstacles to new negotiations, they have piled up both in Russian-American and Russia-West relations. They are difficult to overcome, and this will most certainly take much time and effort. There is a view that negotiations on deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms are possible only after relations between the two countries more or less improve or, at least, show a clear tendency towards improvement.

But this problem can be approached from a different perspective by setting the goal of concluding a new agreement on deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms and limiting the number of strategic warheads to 1,000 for each party. If concluded, the new agreement could serve as a positive example of cooperation and give a chance to reach mutual understanding in other areas. This will be facilitated by the beginning of broad consultations on the whole range of security problems, including those that evoke Russia’s concern.

In July 2018 in Helsinki Putin and Trump agreed to pay special attention to the problem of extension of a New START Treaty for the following 5 years (until the year of 2016), as well as to preserving the INF Treaty which became a subject of serious criticism during the last 3-4 years. It is obviously a positive step into a right direction. But it is not enough. Both states have quite a big potential for further reductions of their nuclear arsenals – strategic and tactical as well even without the participation of the third nuclear states in this process. This possible participation needs serious investigation and special attention of all the interested parties.




[*] Alexander Savelyev - Chief Research Fellow at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow, Russia). In 1989-1991 was a member of Soviet negotiating team at START-1 negotiations (Defense and Space Talks).



AUGUSTUS 14,  2018



 

Abused, trafficked, unwanted – A view on the US migration policy development

Ingrid Noriega

            The US Department of State’s Trafficking In Persons (TIP) Report was started in 2001 as a diplomatic means for the United States to communicate with other foreign governments on goals towards eliminating human trafficking. TIP is meant to facilitate dialogue with nations for anti-trafficking initiatives, as well as find resources on prevention, prosecution, and protection programs of human trafficking, highlighting the United States as a global leader in human rights and law enforcement. The TIP Report ranks countries based on a Tiers model (“2017 Trafficking in Persons Report”). The policy outputs and policy outcomes of TIP have been continuously debated within government, advocacy groups, and law enforcement (Kraft 6).

            There are various critiques on the given Tiers system the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) has used in the previous years. In the “Accountability Over Politics: Scrutinizing the Trafficking in Persons Report” hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee of Foreign Affairs through the House of Representatives during the 114th Congress, David Abramowitz, the Managing Director of Policy and Government Relations of Humanity United Action, has expressed concern on the Tiers model. Abramowitz believes Malaysia is exemplary of a nation praised for the betterment of the human trafficking when undoubtedly there is no accountability for the mass graves incident of 2015, where 130 dead bodies were found (United States 32). Ineffective measures of the tiers in the TIP Report reduce the diplomatic effectiveness of the mechanism, as embodied in both Thailand and Malaysia. Increased effort towards reform of Malaysia and Thailand’s legal framework is needed. This could be achieved through the State Department, more specifically the embassies in Bangkok and Kuala Lampur and the Department’s East Asia and Pacific Bureau. Congressional action could assist in the reform as well (United States 33).

            In the Committee on Foreign Affairs’ “Nomination of Rex Tillerson To Be Secretary of State,” one of the commentaries to the Secretary of State included the notion that the current administration allowed political consideration to manipulate expert recommendations of the State Department’s human rights and trafficking professionals, which contributed to the ‘politically-driven’ upgrade of countries like that of Cuba and Malaysia from the Tier 3 category to the Tier 2 Watch List (United States). According to the Honorable Susan Coppedge, Ambassador-at-Large for the Office to Monitor Trafficking in Persons of the US Department of State, as stated during the Committee on Foreign Relation’s hearing for Review of the 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report, law enforcement services should be provided to human trafficking victims. Government involvement tends to instill fear in victims. In defense of Malaysia status change from Tier 2 watch to Tier 2, as prompted by Mr. Cardin, Coppedge states Malaysia has had quadrupled trafficking investigations increases from 158 to 581, as well as improvements in law enforcement measures on trafficking. Additionally, Senator Robert Menendez had been successful in uncovering the waiver report for Malaysia as well as other countries that are not allowed for disclosure by the Department of State. The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State for the US Department of State, noted Ukraine’s improvement to Tier 2 status as well as China’s ineffectiveness to end slavery and trafficking downgraded it to Tier 3 (United States). Previous concerns and criticism regarding TIP from the “Demanding Accountability: Evaluating the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report”, House of Representatives hearing include concern on grade inflation and favoritism for certain countries through the Department of State tier ranking of the TIP. To further elaborate upon the TIP Tier model, Tier 1 would include nations that meet the minimum standards to combat human trafficking, Tier 2 would include those making noticeable efforts towards the minimum standards, and Tier 3 would include those not making minimum standards and in danger of receiving sanctions, respectively (United States 2). Cuba had been noted as Tier 2 status for 2015, even with the legal permission for prostitution of 16 year old girls, being a top destination in the Western Hemisphere for child sex tourism, and not criminalizing labor trafficking (United States 3). Uzbekistan’s government incites forced labor in the cotton industry on a daily basis, making it rather undeserving of Tier 2 status (United States 4). India as a Tier 2 is undeserving of its ranking as well, since it had been preventing trafficking victims and families whom had obtained T-visas to leave India (United States 27-28).

            As professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic rightfully observed in his revealing work on the Justice-Home Affairs diplomacy, a very corruption (public sector of) is an elementary part of any THB business. “It is a (hidden and) seemingly victimless tradeoff between influence and gain” – as professor brilliantly defines corruption, that ‘runs the engine’.

Hence, as founded by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), from the representation of the Trafficking Victims in Persons Act of 2000, federal agencies have inspected allegations of trafficking crimes, provided training and executed state and local initiatives to support investigations and prosecutions, and established organizational structures, agency-level goals, plans, or strategies. For instance, agencies have trained both new and current staff on investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons crimes through their agency training academies and centers, provided Web-based training, and developed and disseminated guidance on case pursuance. Agencies have also made training initiatives at the state and local law enforcement levels, nongovernmental organizations, and the general public through a toll-free complaint line, newsletters, national conferences, and model legislation. Some agencies have established special units for continuing their antitrafficking duties. Federal agencies coordinate across agencies’ investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes on a case-by-case basis, premised on individual needs per case, and established relationships among law enforcement officials across agencies. The Department of Justice and Department of Health Services officials recognize the need to increase United States efforts to combat trafficking through more practical and cooperative strategies to identify trafficking victims. Previous GAO efforts on interagency relationship prove a strategic framework with shared goals, mutually reinforcing approaches, and compatible policies and actions to function across agency boundaries helps improve and sustain relationships among federal agencies dealing with national and cross agency jurisdiction issues (“Human Trafficking: A Strategic Framework Could Help Enhance the Interagency Collaboration Needed to Effectively Combat Trafficking Crimes.”). Based on 2016 data collection from the GAO, it is questionable as to whether provisions are being fully effective.

For 91 provisions, all responsible federal entities reported taking action to implement this provision. For 11 provisions, all responsible federal entities reported that they had not taken action to implement the provision. For 2 provisions, at least one of the responsible federal entities reported that they had not taken action to implement the provision or they did not provide a response. For 1 provision, none of the responsible federal entities provided a response (“Human Trafficking: Implementation of Related Statutory Provisions, Law Enforcement Efforts, and Grant Funding”).”

The above provisions covered topics address human trafficking and related affairs, inclusive of victim services, management and information sharing, and procedural training. Agency officials gave various explanations for why there were no arrangements to implement provisions for which they were chosen as the lead or co-lead. To be rather frank, in three cases, officials cited funding was not appropriated for the activity. Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials and prosecutors interviewed by the GAO reported properly investigating and prosecuting human trafficking cases is challenging for many reasons, including lack of victim collaboration, limited available services for victims, and the problematic nature of identifying human trafficking victims. According to these representatives, victim service programs, such as those that offer mental health and substance abuse services, have helped improve victim cooperation. The availability of services is limited. Federal, state, and local agencies have taken or are taking actions to address these challenges, such as increasing the obtainability of victim services through grants and executing both training and public awareness initiatives. GAO identified 42 grant programs with awards made in 2014 and 2015 that may be used to combat human trafficking or to assist victims of human trafficking, 15 of which are planned for these purposes only. Although there are similarities among human trafficking grant programs, federal agencies have recognized processes to help avert unnecessary duplication. For instance, in response to endorsements in a previous GAO report, the Department of Justice requires grant candidates to expose any federal grants they are currently operating under as well as federal grants for which they have applied. Additionally, agencies participating in the grantmaking committee of the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG), an entity through which federal agencies unify their efforts to combat human trafficking, share grant solicitations as well as information on proposed grant awards. The SPOG effort allows other agencies to remark on proposed grant awards and determine whether they plan to award funding to the same organization (“Human Trafficking: Implementation of Related Statutory Provisions, Law Enforcement Efforts, and Grant Funding”).

            On the issue of child soldiers, The House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2017 hearing, “Winning the Fight Against Human Trafficking: The Frederick Douglas Reauthorization Act,” affirms that child soldiers are largely affected by the human trafficking industry. The United States has been involved in helping curtail the use of child soldiers. The United States had ratified the United Nations treaty of 2002 which banned the use of children in conflicts. By mandate of ratification, all armed services branched implemented rules to not have underage soldiers in combat. United States’ action on this matter was exemplary for other militaries to follow suite. In 2008, Congress had adopted the Child Soldiers Prevention Act as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. Nevertheless, within the United States there is still a prevalence of sex trafficking of girls. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had reported 60 percent nationwide range of trafficked girls were either from foster care or group homes. More transparency will be required for the allocation of funds towards improving efforts on the issue of child soldiers. The Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act authorizes $130 million over four years to prevent human trafficking, protect victims, and better prosecution in the United States and overseas. The act limits the time a nation could be on the Tier 2 watchlist (United States).

               In the “Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017, H.R. 1191”, sponsored by Representative Christopher Smith in the 115th Congress, it was mentioned that Congress’ Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protections Act of 2000 would probably be the pivotal achievement on the issue of child soldiers. With the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Congress made the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) of 2008 part of the TVPA. Regulations included the TIP Report to have a listing of foreign governments which recruit and utilize child soldiers in their militias or government funded armed groups. The 2017 TIP Report identifies the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen as nations on the CSPA list (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017” 7). TVPA restrictions on grants to nations began with TIP Report 2003 (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017” 14). Nations whom have used child soldiers as listed in the most recent TIP report are prohibited from receiving various forms of security assistance, including defense articles, global military education and training, peacekeeping operations programs, military financing, and the issuing of licenses for direct commercial sales of military equipment for child soldier recruitment purposes (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017” 18-19). Relevant legislation oversight on the TIP Report includes closed hearings on the topic of human trafficking, commonly held by the Committee on Foreign Relations, in anticipation of the TIP’s yearly release as well as commentaries post-publication in public hearings. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically its Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, has also hosted hearings on the TIP Report (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017” 31). A bill from the 115th Congress to further modify requirements associated with the TIP Report, include H.R. 2200, the Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017, which passed the House on July 12, 2017, and contains several changes to the TIP Report’s country ranking process. Other bills introduced in the 115th Congress that, if passed, would modify requirements associated with the TIP Report include H.R. 436, the Human Trafficking Prioritization Act, S. 377, the Trafficking in Persons Report Integrity Act, H.R. 1191, the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017 and H.R. 2219 and S. 952, the End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017 (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017” 31).

               In a statement at the 114th Congress, at a House of Representatives hearing entitled “Get It Right This Time: A Victims-Centered Trafficking in Persons Report,” the following is established:

While democracy does not guarantee the absence of slavery, and some struggling democracies and even democratic regimes have effectively fought trafficking, autocracy and weak or ‘emerging’ democracies are less equipped to tackle this horrific human rights challenge. Respecting the human rights, fundamental freedoms, and dignity in full of women, people in prostitution, and migrants, holding traffickers fully to account, and expunging corruption as the catalyst of human trafficking, are matters of governing justly. In particular, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and a dynamic civil society are the markings of governments that are governing justly, and central to the success of modern day abolition efforts (United States 2).”

Witness protection under the Ministry of Justice had been found to be favorable, however there were still unaccounted for occurrences in Thailand. In 2015, Thailand did not allow traffickers’ ships on land, allowing criminals to escape via ocean routes. There were also unaccounted for Rohingya passengers refused entry. A ‘push-back’ policy does not assist with combatting human trafficking (United States 21). As the Myanmar elections were not free nor fair, political circumstances only escalate the higher risks of the Rohingya for human trafficking (United States 28-29).

            Referencing the 114th Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing “Accountability Over Politics: Scrutinizing the Trafficking In Persons Report”, a statement released by Secretary of State John Kerry focused on the three P’s of the TIP report: prosecuting traffickers, protecting and empowering victims, and preventing future trafficking crimes. The honorable Susan Coppedge, Ambassador-at-Large to the Department of State, voiced concern for the protection of domestic workers as well as ‘corrupt or complicit officials’ whom benefit from trafficking (United States 5). TIP staff members work in conjunction with individuals at embassies, posts abroad, and the US Department of State regional offices (United States 7). Coppedge asserts housing for girls rescued from trafficking should be provided by the United States (United States 20). There is only a small amount of prosecutions and convictions on foreign labor trafficking in the United States, which needs to be reformed. More to protect unaccompanied undocumented children, as well as further address roots of the problem, need to be made feasible (United States 30).

            Bills relevant to TIP include the Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017, H.R. 2200 (“Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017”), The Trafficking in Persons Report Integrity Act, S. 377 (“Trafficking in Persons Report Integrity Act”), The Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017, H.R. 1191 (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017”), the End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017, H.R. 2219 (“End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017”), and the End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 952 (“End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017”).

            The Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017, H.R. 2200, sponsored by Christopher Smith April 2017, had twenty-nine cosponsors from House of Representatives, which ensured approval through the House of Representatives. The twenty-nine cosponsors were Representatives Karen Bass, Edward R. Royce, Sheila Jackson Lee, Susan W. Brooks, Lois Frankel, Ann Wagner, Tony Cardenas, Ted Poe, Ryan A. Costello, David N. Cicilline, Brad Sherman, Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Patrick Meehan, Lynn Jenkins, Susan A. Davis, Salud O. Carbajal, Gwen Moore, Dwight Evans, Denny Heck, James P. McGovern, Tulsi Gabbard, Alcee L. Hastings, Raul M. Grijalva, Kristi L. Noem, Barbara Comstock, Luke Messer, David Young, Erik Paulsen, and Carolyn B. Maloney. This bill states that instead of only the President, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has the authority to award grants to local education agencies, in partnership with nonprofit agencies for awareness services. H.R. 2200 further ensures priority funding for lodging and accommodation purposes that lack policies on child sexual exploitation, and calls for making certain the United States does not fund human trafficking. H.R. 2200 calls upon credible evidence on nations’ human trafficking reform progress. Additionally, airport personnel should identify and report human trafficking victims (“Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017”).

            The Trafficking in Persons Report Integrity Act, S.377, was introduced in 2017 by Senator Robert Menendez, and cosponsored by five Senators, including Marco Rubio, Tim Kaine, Cory Gardner, Rob Portman, and Christopher Coons. The bill aims to amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to clarify standards upon which countries are held accountable for the TIP Report tier ranking model, as well as other purposes related to concrete measures taken towards ending human trafficking. The S.377 amendment includes identifying ‘concrete actions’ and ‘credible evidence’ towards improving the epidemic of human trafficking. Additionally, reports on the amounts of loans towards Tier 2 and Tier 3 countries are to be submitted to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee of Foreign Relations sections in the Senate as well as the House of Representatives, to be distributed by the Secretary of the Treasury (“Trafficking in Persons Report Integrity Act”).

            The Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017, H.R. 1191, was sponsored by Representative Christopher Smith, and cosponsored by Representatives Frederica Wilson, Randy Hultgren, James P. McGovern, and Randy K. Weber, Sr. The purpose of this bill would be to ensure operative enactment of the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008 and hold régimes responsible for having children part of armed conflict, whether that may be as soldiers, servants, or sex slaves. H.R. 1191 also prohibits the selling of armament to nations that look favorably upon the utilization of child soldiers (“Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017”).

            The End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017, H.R. 2219, was sponsored by Representative Edward Royce, and cosponsored by Representatives William Keating, Carolyn Maloney, Mia Love, Patrick Meehan, Brian Fitzpatrick, and Kyrsten Sinema. H.R. 2219 aims for including the financial industry to assist with combatting human trafficking. The purpose would be to resolve and ensure financial accountability of funding towards human trafficking through means such as the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking (“End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017”). H.R. 2219 is not to be confused with S.952, which is of the same bill title. The End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 952, was sponsored by Senator Elizabeth Warren, and cosponsored by Senators James Lankford and Marco Rubio. S. 952 is an amendment to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 to include the Secretary of the Treasury within the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking. This task force is responsible to submitting recommendations to Congress for revising anti-money laundering programs to target money washing found in the human trafficking industry.  The Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council examines processes to improve anti-money laundering programs to combat human trafficking actions and referrals for potential human trafficking cases to the appropriate law enforcement agencies. S. 952 also establishes that the Department of Justice must report both efforts to eliminate money laundering on to human trafficking, and the quantity of formal examinations, custodies, allegations, and criminal offenses in money washing cases related to human trafficking (“End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017”).

            Overall, the TIP Report of 2017 of the Department of State has shown improvement from previous report versions, but is still in need of amendments to address misdemeanors found within the Tier ranking system of nations as well as preferential agreements on the issue of allocation of funding. In defense of efforts made by the Department of State, on September 14, 2017, the Department awarded $25 million to the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery, through the Office to Combat and Monitor Trafficking of Persons. The Global Fund to End Modern Slavery is a non-profit organization focused on developing public-private partnerships to decrease modern slavery (Tillerson). However, a true dedication to the cause of human trafficking, although wanted by many advocacy member groups as well as Congressional members, is a decision today mainly influenced by the executive branch’s priorities. As Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated in his nomination hearing, “Nomination of Rex Tillerson To Be Secretary of State”, his commitment to end human trafficking is only to the extent that is compliant with the policies and law preferences of President-elect Donald Trump. This response was given various times throughout the report, inclusive of a specific interlude question on the seafood industry, raising numbers of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, the need for transparency measures in the fishing industry, and human trafficking (United States). More information on United States’ legislation on the TIP Report could be found if there were public accessibility to Closed Hearings’ materials as well as other confidential material Congressional staffers have access to, such as that of the “CLOSED: Preparing for the Trafficking in Persons Report” of June 2017 (United States).
           

Bibliography

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About the author:



Ingrid Stephanie Noriega

Ingrid Stephanie Noriega is junior specialist in International Relations, Latina of an immense passion for human rights, democratic accountability, and conflict resolution studies as it relates to international development for the Latin America and Middle East – regions of her professional focus.



AUGUSTUS 1,  2018



2018
 

 

PUBLICATIONS AUGUSTUS 2018


 
 
  Keeping the Nuclear Arms Control alive - Alexander Savelyev[*]
  Abused, trafficked, unwanted – A view on the US migration policy development - Ingrid Noriega


PUBLICATIONS JUNE 2018

  Overheating the Humanitarian Law in contemporary international relations - (Refugee Status – a political challenge and legal limbo) - Dr. Nafees Ahmad

  Who are the ‘Willing’ in Central Europe – Axis of the 1930s coming back ? - By Jacques Goodloe
 Retreating construct of the Contemporary International relations - Amel Ouchenane
 The Post-War Order Is Over - (And not because Trump wrecked it.) - By Victor Davis Hanson


PUBLICATIONS MAY 2018

 Planet Junk - Is Earth the Largest Garbage Dump in the Universe? - Robert J. Burrowes
 Why is the Korean Reunification not to Work anytime soon - (Denuclearisation of the Far East long way Ahead)



PUBLICATIONS APRIL 2018

  HOW CAN PARITY BE MORE PROPORTIONAL? - Zlatko Hadžidedić
  TURKEY – EU: Waiting for Godot - By Aaron Denison


PUBLICATIONS MARCH 2018

  De-evolutioning with Brexit and Trump: Where Marx went wrong - Ananya Bordoloi

  The World without Colonies – Dakhla without Potemkin Village - Emhamed Khadad



PUBLICATIONS FEBRUARY 2018

 Future of the Banking Industry – Not without Blockchain - By Oliver Aziator
 Climate Change: Unfit for the residual heat - By Élie Bellevrat and Kira West
 The European Commission's Strategy for the Western Balkans - Bureaucrats Crusade - By Zlatko Hadžidedić
 
ASEAN Shared - the EU twin from Asia: New memories, old wounds - Rattana Lao
 



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prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

Editor - Geopolitics, History, International Relations (GHIR) Addleton Academic Publishers - New YorK

Senior Advisory board member, geopolitics of energy Canadian energy research institute - ceri, Ottawa/Calgary

Advisory Board Chairman Modern Diplomacy & the md Tomorrow's people platform originator

Head of mission and department head - strategic studies on Asia
Professor and Chairperson Intl. law & global pol. studies



Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and Europe - Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic



MENA Saga and Lady Gaga - (Same dilemma from the MENA) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic



Dr. Nguyen Anh Tuan, Assos. Prof.[1] Nguyen Linh[2]
HE ONGOING PUBLIC DEBT CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: IMPACTS ON AND LESSONS FOR VIETNAM - Dr. Nguyen Anh Tuan, Assos. Prof.[1] Nguyen Linh[2]



Carla BAUMER
Climate Change and Re Insurance: The Human Security Issue SC-SEA Prof. Anis Bajrektarevic & Carla Baumer



 
Igor Dirgantara
(Researcher and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Politics, University of Jayabaya)




Peny Sotiropoulou

Is the ‘crisis of secularism’ in Western Europe the result of multiculturalism?




Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella
A Modest “Australian” Proposal to Resolve our Geo-Political Problems

Were the Crusades Justified? A Revisiting - Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella




Alisa Fazleeva
Earned an MA in International Relations from the University of East Anglia in Norwich, United Kingdom in 2013. Her research interests include foreign policy decision-making, realism and constructivism, and social psychology and constructivism.



 
Corinna Metz
She is an independent researcher specialized in International Politics and Peace & Conflict Studies with a regional focus on the Balkans and the Middle East.




Patricia Galves Derolle
Founder of Internacionalista
Săo Paulo, Brazil
Brazil – New Age





Dimitra Karantzeni
The political character of Social Media: How do Greek Internet users perceive and use social networks?

 


Michael Akerib
Vice-Rector
SWISS UMEF UNIVERSITY




  
Petra Posega
is a master`s degree student on the University for Criminal justice and Security in Ljubljana. She obtained her bachelor`s degree in Political Science- Defense studies.


Contact: posegap@live.com





Samantha Brletich,
 George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and Intl. Relations She focuses on Russia and Central Asia. Ms. Brletich is an employee of the US Department of Defense.


Interview on HRT-Radio

Prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarević




Dr Filippo ROMEO,



Julia Suryakusuma is the outspoken Indonesian thinker, social-cause fighter and trendsetter. She is the author of Julia’s Jihad.

Contact: jsuryakusuma@gmail.com 




Gerald Knaus




Mads Jacobsen
Mads is an intern at PCRC. Mads Jacobsen is from Denmark and is currently pursuing his Master's degree in 'Development and International Relations' at Aalborg University...




Dzalila Osmanovic-Muharemagic
University of Bihac, Faculty of Education, Department of English Language and Literature - undergraduate
University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Philology, Department of English Language and Literature - graduate study




Rakesh Krishnan Simha

New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. According to him, he writes on stuff the media distorts, misses or ignores.

Rakesh started his career in 1995 with New Delhi-based Business World magazine, and later worked in a string of positions at other leading media houses such as India Today, Hindustan Times, Business Standard and the Financial Express, where he was the news editor.

He is the Senior Advisory Board member of one of the fastest growing Europe’s foreign policy platforms: Modern Diplomacy.





Damiel Scalea
Daniele Scalea, geopolitical analyst, is Director-general of IsAG (Rome Institute of Geopolitics) and Ph.D. Candidate in Political studies at the Sapienza University, Rome. Author of three books, is frequent contributor and columnist to various Tv-channels and newspapers. E-mail: daniele.scalea@gmail.com




Alessio Stilo,
 
Research Associate at Institute of High Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (IsAG), Rome, Italy, and Ph.D. researcher at University of Padova, is IMN Country Representative in Italy.




Tomislav Jakić
Foreign Policy Advisor to former Croatian President Stjepan Mesić





Zlatko Hadžidedić

Graduate of the London School of Economics, prof. Zlatko Hadžidedić is a prominent thinker, prolific author of numerous books, and indispensable political figure of the former Yugoslav socio-political space in 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.




Mr. Nicola Bilotta
Nicola Bilotta has a BA and a MA in History from Universitŕ degli Studi di Milano and a MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics. He works as a Global Finance Research Assistant at The Banker (Financial Times) and collaborates as an external researcher at ISAG (Istituto di Alti Studi di Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliari) N_bilotta@lse.ac.uk




Markus Wauran

Date and Place of Birth: April 22, 1943 – Amurang, North Sulawesi, IndonesiaEducation: Bachelor in Public Administration.
Writer was a member of the House of Representatives of Indonesia (DPR/MPR-RI) period of 1987-1999, and Chairman of Committee X, cover Science and Technology, Environment and National Development Planning (1988-1997).
Currently as Obsever of Nuclear for peace
.




Sooyoung Hu

Attached to the US-based Berkeley University, Sooyoung Hu is a scholar at its Political Science and Peace and Conflict Studies Department. Miss Hu focuses on international relations, international organizations and its instruments.




Senahid LAVIĆ





Nizar Visram
 Nizar Visram is a Ottawa-based free-lance writer from Zanzibar, Tanzania. Recently retired Senior lecturer on Development studies, he extensively publishes in over 50 countries on 4 continents. He can be reached at
nizar1941(at)gmail.com .




Robert Leonard Rope
He studied at the University of Michigan,
He lives in: San Francisco, California: San Francisco, California, USA




Dragan Bursac,
Journalist




Dr. Enis OMEROVIĆ




Max Hess
Max Hess is a senior political risk analyst with the London-based AEK international, specializing in Europe and Eurasia.




Ananya Bordoloi
Ananya Bordoloi is a Malaysia based researcher in the fields of international relations, global governance and human rights. Author has previously worked with Amnesty International in research and data collection capacity, and for a publishing company as a pre-editor.





Robert J. Burrowes
 has a lifetime commitment to understanding and ending human violence. He has done extensive research since 1966 in an effort to understand why human beings are violent and has been a nonviolent activist since 1981. He is the author of Why Violence?’ His email address is flametree@riseup.net and his website is here.





Amel Ouchenane is a member of the organization of Security and Strategic studies in Algeria. She is also Research Assistant at the Idrak Research Center for Studies and Consultations.
Ms. Ouchenane was researcher at Algiers University from 2011 to 2018. (Department of International relations and African studies).




Dr. Nafees Ahmad
Ph. D., LL.M, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University (SAARC)-New Delhi, Nafees Ahmad is an Indian national who holds a Doctorate (Ph.D.) in International Refugee Law and Human Rights. Author teaches and writes on International Forced Migrations, Climate Change Refugees & Human Displacement Refugee, Policy, Asylum, Durable Solutions and Extradition issues.